


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east timor

australia



&
the region

**NATIONAL
CONFERENCE**

adelaide

january 27th - 29th 1979

conference booklet

\$2.50

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INTRODUCTION

This booklet contains many of the papers that were given at the East Timor, Australia and the Region National Conference which was held in Adelaide, South Australia between 27th - 29th January 1979.

The Conference attracted one hundred and fifty people, many from overseas, and the topics discussed were very wide-ranging.

The aim of the organisers was to provide a forum where information about movements for independence in the Pacific & South East Asia could be disseminated. Specifically we wanted to highlight the Indonesian invasion of the Democratic Republic of East Timor along with the complicity of the U.S., Australian and A.S.E.A.N governments.

We wish to apologise for the late arrival of this booklet which has been produced by a band of dedicated volunteers in their spare time.

Because of the time that has elapsed since the Conference, some of the papers have been updated. This is especially true of the Pacific section.

In particular, the organising committee wishes to pay tribute to the following for their help in producing the booklet:-

- * conference speakers
- * typing: Deborah Hall, and a special mention to Laurel Ivchenko who typed most of the manuscript.
- * lay-out: Bob Hanney, Pam Irving, Bill Ivey, Fran Sylvester, Mike Walsh
- * proof reading: Bill Ivey and Fran Sylvester.
- * Peoples Bookshop (Adelaide) and the Communist Party of Australia who have generously extended to us the use of their facilities for laying out.
- * Ken Scott of Shovel & Bull Printers for technical advice.

Solidarity is expressed to Nonie Sharp whose papers were destroyed when her house was burnt out recently. Hopefully, an updated version of her papers will appear later as her contribution to the Conference was invaluable to the understanding of the liberation movement in the West Irian.

Andrew Alcock

Editor, for the East Timor & the Region
National Conference Organising Committee

c/o World Workshop

112b Gays Arcade, Adelaide, S.A. 5000.

April 1980.

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CIET (SA) c/o World Workshop →
or EAST TIMOR NEWS AGENCY
232 CASTLEREAGH ST, SYDNEY 2000
\$2.50 per copy \$2 per copy for orders of 20
(+ postage)

CONFERENCE PROGRAM

27th January

OPENING PLENARY SESSION

"AN OVERVIEW OF THE REGION"

- *Address: "East Timor, Australia and the Region"
-Tom Uren Member of the House of Representatives
in the Australian Parliament

PLENARY SESSION: "INTERESTS IN THE REGION"

- *Address: "Australia's Role in the Region"
-Jim Hyde (author of "Australia-the Asia Connection")
- *Address: "Multinational Corporations and Big Power Interests
in the Region"
-Kate Short (co-author of "Transnational
Corporations in SE Asia and the Pacific")

WORKSHOP SESSION

- * 1. "Foreign Bases in Australia and the Region"
-Rita Helling (philosophy lecturer, Flinders Uni)
- 2. "Foreign Economic Interests in Asia"
-Kate Short
- 3. "Foreign Economic Interests in the Pacific"
-Mike Parsons (South Pacific Action Network)
- * 4. "Pacific Rim Strategy"
-Jim Hyde and Laurel Black (Politics Dept. Uni of
Adelaide)

PLENARY SESSION: EAST TIMOR & WEST PAPUA NEW GUINEA

- *Address: "East Timorese People's Struggle for Independence"
-Denis Freney (Secretary of Campaign for Independent
East Timor, Sydney)
- Address: "West Papua New Guinea- Another Cause for Australian
Shame" -Nonie Sharp (author of "The Rule of the
Sword")
- *Address: "Indonesia's Role in East Timor & West PNG"
-Keith Suter (senior tutor, St John's College,
Sydney Uni)

WORKSHOP SESSION

- *1. "Military Aid to Indonesia"
-George Preston (Secretary of Australia East
Timor Association)
- 2. "West Papua New Guinea"
-Mike Parsons & Nonie Sharp
- *3. "Strategic Interests in East Timor"
-Bill Tulley (Australian National Library)
- 4. "East Timor-a personal account"
-Carol Jobson (formerly a nurse in East Timor)



*paper or synopsis contained in this booklet

28th January PLENARY SESSION: "ASIAN BACKGROUND"

*Address: "Movements in Asia Since Vietnam"
-Bruce McFarlane (Politics Dept., Uni of Adelaide)

Address: "ASEAN- the Nature of the Regimes"
-Ian Bell (Indonesia Action Group, Melbourne)

WORKSHOP SESSION

- *1. "Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea Since 1975"
-Beverley Smith (Asian Studies lecturer, South Australian Institute of Technology)
2. "Human Rights in ASEAN Countries"
-Jeff Richards (Campaign Against Repression in the Pacific and Asia, Adelaide)
- *3. "Indonesian Foreign Policy"
-Laurel Black

PLENARY SESSION: "PACIFIC BACKGROUND"

*Address: "Movements for Independence in the Pacific"
-Mike Parsons

Address: "Imperialism in the Pacific"
-Rebecca Evans (Maori and Pacific People's Revolutionary Front)

WORKSHOP SESSION

- *1. "Nuclear Free Pacific Campaign"
-Ashley Campbell (Convenor, Pacific Solidarity in Adelaide and Campaign Against Nuclear Energy activist)
2. "Land Rights for Australian Aborigines"
-Peter Pinnington (Aboriginal Child Care Agency in South Australia)
3. "Vanuaaka and New Caledonia"
-Rebecca Evans

29th January PLENARY SESSION: WHAT AUSTRALIA'S ROLE SHOULD BE IN THE REGION

Address: "What Australia's Economic Role in the Region Should Be"
-Alistair Fisher (Economics Dept, Uni of Adelaide)

Address: "What Australia's Diplomatic Role in the Region Should Be"
-Richie Gun (Chairperson of the Campaign for Independent East Timor in South Australia and former Aust. Labor Party member for Kingston in the Aust Parliament)

WORKSHOP SESSION

1. "Role of Trade Unions"
-Ted Gnatenko (Amalgamated Metal Workers & Shipwrights Union in South Australia)
2. "Role of Community Groups"
-Beth Mylius (Action for World Development in South Australia)

*3. "Role of Aid and Trade"

-Sarah Sargent and Steve Keen (Freedom From Hunger's Ideas Centre, Sydney)

This paper could not be presented at the conference as the authors were deterred from coming at the last minute.

4. "Role of Trade Unions"

-Brian Manning (Darwin-Timor Radio)

FINAL PLENARY SESSION

* Conference Resolutions

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Newcastle Trades Hall Council
Newcastle Workers Club
Seamen's Union(Newcastle Branch)
Seamen's Union(Ports Committee, SA)
Swansea Workers Club
Unitarian Church, Melbourne
United Nations Association of Australia(SA Division)
Waterfront Watchmen(Newcastle Section)
Waterside Workers Federation(Newcastle Branch)

CONFERENCE ORGANISERS WOULD ALSO LIKE TO THANK THE
FOLLOWING FOR ASSISTANCE IN PLANNING THE CONFERENCE:

Adelaide University Student Association Public
Affairs Committee
Action for World Development Collective(SA)
Brian Witty
Patrick Flannagan
World Workshop Collective
Peoples Bookshop

and to all those who have helped by contributing papers,
billeting visitors, preparing and serving food, child-
minding, making programme suggestions, contacting key
people etc etc

PAPERS

**theme: EAST TIMOR, AUSTRALIA AND THE
REGION — AN OVERVIEW.**

Address: "EAST TIMOR, AUSTRALIA AND THE REGION" -Hon. Tom Uren, MHR.

I thank the organisers for the honour of opening this conference. It is a conference that attempts to pull together the joint understandings of the situation in East Timor in relation to the political economy of the Asia-Pacific region and Australia's role in it. That is an important step forward, since too many of our previous actions - the official actions at least - in relation to Indonesia and East Timor particularly, have been taken with a poor conception of political-economic relations in the region as a whole.

The East Timorese people have been gallant and courageous in their struggles for independence and freedom. They were extraordinarily courageous in their resistance to Japanese fascism in the Second World War. At that time, weakened as a result of Portuguese colonial neglect, they resisted by guerilla action the intrusion of the Japanese. They gave support and protection to our Australian troops who were fighting in the mountains of Portuguese Timor. Without their courageous support our troops could not have survived. Of a population of around 600,000, they lost over 50,000 in that war. The dimensions of that sacrifice can be seen against the Australian loss of 35,000 in all theatres of the Second World War.

But that sacrifice did not lead to independence and freedom for the East Timorese people. The Japanese may have been pushed back. But that was mainly to the advantage of Australia's defence and in the interests of big American and British companies wanting to exploit the region in new ways.

After the war against the Japanese, the people of East Timor had to suffer continued Portuguese oppression while the big international power forces plotted new designs for them. Then those forces supported the expansionist plans of the Indonesian generals in their takeover of East Timor.

On 7th December, 1975, those new designs took their tragic form. The Javanese generals invaded what had become through bitter internal struggle the Democratic Republic of East Timor.

Since that time, the Indonesians have massacred about 100,000 East Timorese in their takeover and attempt to control East Timor.

Australia betrayed its former allies, acting in complicity with the Indonesians. As the design unfolds, Australia's role grows even more treacherous and cynical, culminating in the de jure recognition on 15 December 1978, of Indonesia's brutal annexation.

It must be said at this stage that there have also been many courageous people in Australia struggling on behalf of the rights of the East Timorese. And it must be remembered that there are still many Fretilin forces continuing fighting there. The battle for East Timor is not over. It is not too late to reverse the situation.

But in order to reverse it, in order to re-establish an independent East Timor, we in Australia need a much clearer understanding on what has happened, how it has happened and why it has happened. For these purposes, this is an extremely important conference.

There is a guilt upon Australia for our failure to fulfil our regional responsibilities. We should have and we could have stood up to defend the liberties of the East Timorese people. Instead, we played out a subservient role to the interests of international capital, courting the Indonesians, contradicting the principles we espoused, and selling out the East Timorese.

The recent negotiations between the Australian and Indonesian Governments over the gap in the sea-bed boundary between Australia and Timor show in a clearer light what is at stake in the takeover of East Timor. Australia's Foreign Affairs Department has actively pursued the line of integrating Australia more closely into the ASEAN region. That integration has perceived advantages for big companies in Australia, especially those that are foreign owned or controlled.

There are, for example, over 100 companies from Australia now operating in Indonesia, exploiting the anti-union and corrupt conditions there to produce goods at cheaper wage costs. These companies include: Repco, Colonial Sugar Refinery, Commonwealth Industrial Gases, Blue Metal Industries, Australian Consolidated Industries and Kiwi -- which are Australian owned. And they include the transnationals Ford, General Motors, Kennecott and the drug companies.

That integration has been particularly encouraged by American transnational corporations. Those corporations and the US Government have consistently influenced Australia to develop "friendly relations" with Indonesia and other ASEAN nations. The Fraser government's trade and foreign policies are consistent with that line, in spite of the difficulties created in Australia between different sections of capital and for labour.

US involvement in the support of the Suharto regime, and specifically for its annexation of East Timor, has already been documented and will be discussed in further detail at this conference. Australian complicity with that forceful takeover has its base in the profit-seeking interests of these powerful corporations, seeking to control the Asia-Pacific region.

The current sea-bed boundary negotiations reveal the extent of their interests. Australian oil companies, mostly foreign owned by American and European corporations, are actively involved in the Timor sea, particularly in the Joseph Bonaparte Gulf within the sea-bed boundary gap between East Timor and Australia. From the Indonesian side, the US oil firm Oceanic Exploration Co., which operates throughout South-East Asia, has a lease that extends to the mid point or line of equidistance between the Australian and Timor coasts. That lease overlaps with six leases granted by the Australian Government through the West Australian and Northern Territory Departments of Mines and Energy to such companies as Woodside-Burmah, Shell, British Petroleum, Esso, Mid Eastern Getty Oil, North-West Shelf Development, Australian Aquitaine and Pelsart Oil NL.

Some of these leases are due for renewal in 1980 and 1983. Normally, the companies are required to show a certain level of expenditure or drilling activity for their leases to be eligible for renewal. The Northern Territory Department of Mines and Energy

has recently exempted these companies from those requirements pending the settlement of the disputed sea-bed areas. But it is clear where the pressures on the Australian Government are coming from.

In the interests of Oceanic, the Portuguese Government in East Timor pushed for a sea-bed boundary, in the Bonaparte Basin, midway between Australia and East Timor, even though Indonesia had capitulated on the rest of the boundary that gave Australia a two-thirds holding. In the same interests, the Indonesian Government is pressing the former Portuguese claim. In the interests of the oil companies with the other six leases in that area, the Australian Government is pressing for a continuation of what they call the "natural" dividing line between the Timor shelf and the Indonesian shelf, a line the Indonesian continental shelf expert and Foreign Minister Mochtar disputes.

In negotiating with Indonesia on this issue, the Australian Government conceded Indonesian territorial rights, in defiance of the existence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. In addition, the Australian Government has traded off not only official recognition of the Indonesian takeover, but also the issues relating to the reunification of East Timorese families, 2,500 members of which fled to Australia before the Indonesian invasion.

Those refugees originally applied for about 1,850 relatives to join them. The number was whittled down to 600 as a result of Indonesian concern at a large group of anti-Indonesian East Timorese in Australia. That 600 was to include heads of families resident in East Timor. But only about 100, many old and of Chinese descent, and not heads of families, arrived. Those remaining in Indonesian-occupied East Timor have been discriminated against on account of their applications to leave.



The Australian Government has been outmanouvred by the Indonesians into giving official recognition of their forceful annexation and sold out the refugees as well as the East Timorese people in general, all for the resolution of sea-bed boundary disputes to the satisfaction of transnational corporations.

I make these points -- which are not new to you -- for two purposes. Firstly, we need to understand the extent of foreign corporate power in our region, as it affects us and, tragically, as it affects the East Timorese people. Secondly, as a member of Cabinet at the time of Indonesia's preparation for its invasion of East Timor after the generals had talks with Kissinger and with the Australian Prime Minister, I wish to point out how much the Cabinet was kept in ignorance of the issue and presented with biased advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs.

It is another episode that highlights how much the Australian nation is a pawn in the play of overseas corporations and other nations.

This is not to excuse the responsibility borne by the Labor Government and its Ministers. It is not to displace our blame. It is merely to point to the realities of power.

We were not adequately informed of the internal situation in Indonesia that would have led us to a better assessment of the overall situation.... the crisis in Pertamina, the growing dissatisfaction with the corrupt Java administration, the extent of guerilla activity in West Sumatra, West and North Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi and in West Irian. Hence, the expansionist interests of the Javanese generals and their desire to externalise their internal difficulties were not apparent to us.

That is a history that now needs to be analysed and understood. For the present, however, we need to watch closely and interpret what is going on in terms of Australia's relations with Indonesia, the extent and direction of so-called aid, joint military exercises, increased trade and cultural exchange.

Our aid has been channelled through the generals, partly to assist their repressive activities and to promote their military expansion. The Indonesian Red Cross has received \$331,270 from the Fraser Government to assist the Indonesian program of indoctrination in East Timor. Invitations have been extended by the Fraser Government for visits to Australia by President Suharto, Foreign Minister Mochtar and Defence Minister General Yusuf. Australia's dangerous "friendship" with the Javanese Generals is being developed at the expense of the East Timorese, and in my opinion at the expense of the majority of the Indonesian people. We need to understand the implications of that.

I am sure the conference will examine these and other issues in impressive depth. It is important to do so. It is important not to be daunted by the realities of power in our region and by our historical complicity, but to take the example of the East Timorese people and keep supporting their fight.

We also need to work out ways of informing the ordinary Australian people what is really going on.

--oOo--

theme: INTERESTS IN THE REGION.

AUSTRALIA'S ROLE IN THE REGION - AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE -

JIM HYDE - AUTHOR OF "AUSTRALIA-THE ASIA CONNECTION".

Imperialism in Southeast Asia should be viewed in an historical perspective. It is important that each incident is not seen as an isolated event, but as inter-related parts of an overall strategy. That strategy - not conspiracy - is known for the region as the Pacific Rim Strategy. It is part of the world-wide phenomenon of imperialism, as the capitalist superpowers ensure the survival of capitalism. Harry Magdoff has written:-

Imperialism is not a matter of choice for a capitalist society; it is the way of life of such a society. 1.

The strategy by which imperialism is pursued in the Pacific Basin should be treated in this wider perspective. In fact, the bases of United States policy in the region were firmly set in Europe, as Kolko has demonstrated:

... the global perspective of the United States between 1946 and 1949 stressed the decisive importance of Europe to the future of world power. When the United States looked at Indo-China they saw France, and through it Europe, and a weak France would open the door to communism in Europe. 2.

Victory for France in Vietnam was essential for the US for a number of reasons. Firstly, France was needed in Europe to contribute to regional defence. Second, the US was convinced that victory to the Vietnamese would result in a 'domino' effect which would effectively remove Southeast Asia from the capitalist arena. Third, the Viet Minh and later the Viet Cong were seen as Russian puppets, and their victory would give Russia a strategic advantage in Asia, especially given the victory of the Chinese people in 1949.

When it became obvious that the French were unable to cope with the Vietnamese revolution, the US began to take a leading role in the organisation of the war. It refused to recognise the Geneva Accords of 1954, and set about propping up first the notoriously corrupt and repressive Diem regime, and then those which followed it in the 1960s. The seeds for massive US intervention were already sown by 1954, not only in Vietnam, but elsewhere in Asia. For instance, US citizens gained the right to act in business in the Philippines on the same basis as Filipinos as part of a trans-colonial-independence agreement even though other foreign nationals were limited to 40% interest by the Philippine Constitution. The importance of the region as a supplier of raw materials was also recognised early, and served as an extra rationale for direct US intervention. Nixon, as Vice-President, put it in 1953:

If Indo-China falls, Thailand is put in an almost impossible position. The same is true of Malaya with its rubber and tin. The same is true of Indonesia. If this whole part of Southeast Asia goes under Communist domination or Communist influence, Japan, who trades and must trade with this area in order to exist, must inevitably be oriented towards the Communist regime. 3.

President Eisenhower reiterated the line:

If we lost Vietnam and Malaya, how would we, the free world, hold the rich empire of Indonesia. 4

and went on to explain that the loss of Indo-China:

... would take away that region Japan must have as a trading area, or it would force Japan to turn toward China and Manchuria, or toward the communist areas in order to live. The possible consequences of the loss of Japan to the free world are just incalculable. 5

Kennedy also recognized the dangers to the Strategy posed by the Indonesian oil dispute of 1963-64. After the war the US had moved back into its oil fields in Indonesia on extremely favourable terms which lasted until 1960. At that time, new laws restricting exploration and concession ownership were introduced, tying concessions to the state enterprises Permindo, Pertamina and Permina, which controlled the leases. Moreover, the new legislation allowed the state enterprises to increase their hold on the industry by way of diversification wherein some contracts were awarded to Japanese companies and to other independent US enterprises. By 1963 however, the companies were unhappy about their agreements, and a conflict arose, during the course of which they threatened to withdraw, and the Indonesian Government threatened to expel them. Kennedy sent special emissaries to act as consultants at new negotiations in Tokyo, and in 1964 the oil companies were forced to accept new agreements:

The United States view was that a poorly managed oil industry, by aggravating the country's economic ills, would push Indonesia further into the Communist sphere. 6

In the same context, Kennedy also agreed to accept Australia's request to upgrade ANZUS, not because of any imagined danger Indonesia posed to Australia, but to prepare for possible problems in two specific areas relating to the overall Strategy, "nuclear strategy and Indo-China" 7.

It was obvious then, as early as 1949, that the United States had evaluated the changing strategic significance of the Pacific Basin. Initially in the Pacific Basin as elsewhere, there was strong emphasis on the military to ensure the integration of the region into the capitalist arena. This has changed in two ways, not least because of the victory of the people of Indo-China. Less obvious reliance is placed on military methods of securing the region by the US, and more on economic penetration and integration. Where military muscle is needed, regional powers undertake the fighting, backed heavily nonetheless by military aid and assistance from the US. Before the peoples' victory in Indo-China the US built up a presence in Asia, which excluding the Vietnam forces cost it some \$US16 billion per annum to maintain. This, as the late Malcolm Caldwell observed, meant that Asia created "the second greatest regional demand for US non war military expenditure". 8 With the cost of Vietnam included, Asia accounted for some 60% of US military expenditure. 9. Importantly, it led to the internationalization of the region as US based multinationals grew in economic influence, and with the US government, political influence. This in turn enabled the strong pursuit of the economic arm of the Pacific Rim Strategy after 1975.

This new stance, known as the Nixon Doctrine, has meant that the US is pursuing the Strategy through the internationalization of the region via regional development. Within a three tier strategy, the US and Japan sit at the apex. Standing in their support are Australia, New Zealand and Canada. As nations of the second tier it is their role to act as sources of raw materials, as markets, and as important secondary bases for investment and expansion in the countries of the third tier - Asian Third World states. Because of their underdevelopment, these countries - as they rapidly become neo-colonies of the

US and now Japan - have an enormous growth potential. It has been argued by a mainstream economist and business leader that:

Regionalism is essentially a myth. Economically it may provide a basis for complimentary industrialization, that it, agreed specialization in the interests of larger markets, and thus larger, more efficient, and ultimately more diversified industry. 10

This sums up well the Nixon Doctrine for the preservation of the region for US interests.

Since the early 1950s both the Liberal Country Party and the ALP had opposed Indonesia's claims to West Irian, then the last remaining foothold of Dutch colonialism in Southeast Asia. With the inauguration of the Kennedy administration, however, US support for Indonesia led to the transfer of the territory from the Dutch in 1962, and most importantly for Australia, forced the Australian Government to reconsider its position on the region. Its two most important allies, the US and the UK had differed substantially on the issue. The next decade saw past loyalties to the UK lose some of their importance as the Australian Government moved closer to the US, and eventually adopt an almost carbon copy foreign policy. Sir Garfield Barwick, the then Minister for External Affairs (and now the country's Chief Justice), led the moves for Australian accommodation of US policies. Barwick wanted to placate Indonesia as Australia's closest and largest neighbour. The next couple of years saw some oscillation in Australia's position, with Australia taking part in the anti-Indonesian campaign which followed the latter's Konfrontasi policies against Malaysia. The readjustment of Australian policy was not confined to the Government; the ALP also supported the anti-Indonesian campaign. The military coup in Indonesia in 1965, however provided the pro-US forces in Australia with the opportunity to become dominant. By early 1967 both the Government and the Opposition had come publicly to attach a great deal of importance to Australia's relations with the new Indonesian Government, and the course for Australia's relations with Southeast Asia was set.

By the early 1970s the policies of successive LCP Governments had firmly established Australia in the Pacific Rim Strategy. However, its role was hampered by protectionist trade and tariff policies. The LCP did not tackle the problem forcefully. The election of the ALP Government in 1972 saw the beginning of a rapid efficiency drive for Australia in the region which began to show quick results, and set the course for Australia's continuing involvement in Southeast Asia. The ALP indicated that Australia's relations with Indonesia should serve as the future model for Australian investment in Southeast Asia. 11 Australian based companies reacted favourably to the Government's initiatives in Indonesia. In 1973/74, total Australian overseas investment was \$A182 million, compared with \$A123 million in 1972/73 and \$A119 million in 1971/72. Of the \$A182 million, some \$A35 million was invested in Southeast Asia (excluding Papua New Guinea), where another \$A42 million was invested. Given that Australian companies invested about \$A250 million in Indonesia between 1966-73 it is reasonable to assume that the bulk of the \$A35 million went to Indonesia in line with the example of the Government. 12 Under the ALP, it became obvious that the economic and defence involvement in the region were closely inter-related. Barnard, then Defence Minister linked the two in a speech to Parliament in August 1973:

Another important factor in the global situation is the economic field. In particular, the growing dependence of large industrial economies of the uninterrupted, world-wide flow of raw materials, places increasing importance on the stable management of international relations. 13

During the ALPs term of office the Government concluded first with Indonesia, and later with most of the other ASEAN nations, an Investment Guarantee Agreement, and joint arrangements for minerals marketing and pricing. In December 1974, it began to conclude a series of cultural agreements with the ASEAN nations modelled on the Indonesian-Australian Cultural Agreement signed by the McMahon LCP Government. The Investment Guarantee Agreement sought to stimulate investment in Indonesia by providing a guarantee that the Indonesian Government would not nationalise or expropriate companies, freeze company funds or block transfer of profits and funds out of Indonesia. If any such action should occur, the Export Payments Insurance Corporation (EPIC) was to cover the loss and, via the OECDs International Convention on Investment Disputes, resort to arbitration to recover the losses from the Indonesian Government. The agreement was non-reciprocal, unlike most other similar agreements and consequently, as Brenchley has pointed out was "fairly one-sided in that most of the obligations of a non-reciprocal agreement tend to fall on one party." 14. These were provisions which the Australian Government was ready enough to endorse since the reason for the treaty, as Brenchley also noted, "was to protect the Australian investor and to create a favourable psychological climate for Australian investment." 15. Soon after taking office Whitlam announced that Australia was ready to offer through defence co-operation "to provide troops, facilities, training courses and equipment to Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Fiji. 16. This was in addition to arrangements with Singapore and Malaysia under the Five Power Agreement. Barnard made several visits to ASEAN countries, joint exercises, both naval and military, were undertaken, and Australian armed forces also took part in specialised projects.

The Government's aim in updating Australia's relations with Southeast Asia was to ensure that we continued to retain a position near the top of the Pacific Rim Strategy. This was an acceptance of a tactic first outlined by McInnes in 1970. The McInnes argument was that Australia must accept a lesser position in the Strategy, though one nearer the top than the bottom. To get this position, it must accept the operations of foreign multinationals - though on a politically acceptable basis - and then meet such foreign investment with its own large firms, which already had their own foreign investment in the region. It outlined a strategy for building up Australian multinationals. Capital should not be wasted on small equity purchases, but should be concentrated in a few areas where it should be invested in new technology. In all areas, Australia should demand new technology as the price for allowing free access to the multinationals, exporting existing outdated technology to Asia: McInnes argued that

... the Australian-based international companies exporting old technology to Asia could be Australian-foreign partnerships, which would mean that the US and Europe were using Australia as a preferable (because non-imperialist, non-neocolonialist) approach to Asia, the way US business now uses its Spanish subsidiaries to get work in Latin America. 17

Essentially Australia must accept the division of labour "offered" by the multi-nationals, if it is to retain its position in the Pacific Rim Strategy, because if it did not it would be left with outdated technology and diminished lines of regional trade. The multinational corporations realize the suspicion in which they are held, and as a result have adopted specific tactics to shield themselves from direct exposure and criticism. Increasingly they have entered into joint ventures with national companies, often state enterprises, which gives them a number of advantages; political power and importance both of considerable help in taking care of tariffs tax incentives, labour disputes, sales and exports.

By accepting the outline of the strategy offered by McInnes in 1970 and moving Australia into closer regional ties, economically, culturally and in defence co-operation with Southeast Asia, the ALP played an important role in the Pacific Rim Strategy, which has been continued under the Fraser Government. For the price of obtaining regional metropole status, Australia has become an important base for multinational penetration into the region. The US saw Australia's new independent role in "resources diplomacy" and membership of international multilateral producers organisations, policies continued after the change of Government in 1975, as enlightened and positive factors in regional relations. 18

Successive Australian Governments have made it clear that Indonesia should be viewed as the model for Australian relations with Southeast Asia. Considerable sums in civil and military aid have been expended in the region, and in incentives to Australian-based companies to both invest in, and export to, the region. This has been achieved through the Export Payments Insurance Corporation, through investment climate studies, and tariff and trade policies which protect Australian-based investment and the principles of profit and capital repatriation. These policies are designed to strengthen Australia's position in the region, and the Pacific Rim Strategy, the success of which holds continuing importance in Australian thinking.

There are however, some important factors to be recognised in relation to the Pacific Rim Strategy. First as I stressed at the beginning of the paper, it is a theory formulated to explain imperialism - which is a world-wide phenomenon - in the Pacific Basin, and as such it should be recognised that there are external factors which impinge upon it. Some of these may be the role of capitalist powers which are not part of the region as such, or the role of non-aligned or other Third World states in supporting the various liberation movements which exist in the third tier nations of Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Second, within the Strategy there is the continual possibility for change. It should not be seen as being fixed, as events in the past in relation to Japan's position have shown. Unfortunately, the use of a spatial metaphor in relation to the Strategy does encourage the idea of inflexibility in the theory, but if this disadvantage is recognised, the advantages of its use to explain simply and clearly the complexities of imperialism in the region can be fully realised. Third, this paper does not make as much as it might of the existence of inter-imperialist rivalry between the US and Japan. Within the region this is of crucial importance, especially given Japan's massive trade surplus, the weakness of its economic base in relation to raw materials, and the growing moves of the US to force Japan back into a more favourable position vis-a-vis the US. Of growing importance too, is the entry of West Germany into the region as a supplier of capital and technology with the concomitant real possibility that the rivalries of Western Europe between the US, Japan and the EEC will assume increasing importance in the Pacific Basin.

Perhaps the most important factor affecting the Pacific Rim Strategy in the immediate future are the recent events in China and Indo-China, particularly in Vietnam. The opening up of both countries to foreign investment by the capitalist superpowers will mean at least a capital drain away from Southeast Asia as available investment resources are redirected to new, and potentially more lucrative projects. Rivalry between China and Vietnam presents the possibility of the growth of a new trading block within the region as well as a fundamental realignment within the Pacific Rim Strategy. China's growing relations with the US, and Vietnam's commercial relations with Japan, together with the overtures made by each to the ASEAN nations, will be increasingly important in the region in the future.

It is obvious from the policies pursued by the present Australian Government, that Australia has recognised that changes are imminent in the Pacific Basin. Australia has courted the Chinese and cooled relations with Vietnam, to which it has suspended all forms of aid. Clearly the Government is pursuing policies which it believes will enable Australia to retain its position within the Pacific Rim Strategy in the event of major changes in relations in the region.

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NOTES:

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- 2 G. Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy, (Boston, Beacon Press, 1969) p. 94
- 3 Kolko, The Roots of p 99-100
- 4 P. Wiley, "America's 'Pacific Rim' Strategy", Australian Left Review, Aug/Sept 1970 p 12.
- 5 loc cit
- 6 A. Hunter, "The Indonesian Oil Industry", in The Economy of Indonesia, B. Glassburner (ed), (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1971) p. 269
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- 8 M. Caldwell, "ASEANisation", Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol 4
- 9 loc cit.
- 10 J.L. Richardson, "Political and Strategic Relations", in Asia and the Pacific in the 1970's, B. Brown (ed), (Canberra ANU Press 1971) p. 148
- 11 E.G. Whitlam, Australian Foreign Affairs Record, Vol 44 No.5 p33940
- 12 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Overseas Investment 1973-74 (preliminary) (Canberra, 1975) p 6.
- 13 L. Barnard, CPD, House of Representatives, 17 August 1973
- 14 F. Brenchley, "Guarantees for Australian Investors in Indonesia Break New Ground", National Times, 30 July - 4 August, 1973
- 15 loc cit.
- 16 E.G. Whitlam, Australian, 7 February 1973
- 17 N. McInnes, "The Challenge of the Multinational Corporation", in Big Business in Australia, G.G. Masterman (ed), (Sydney, Angus and Robertson 1970) p 80
- 18 Marshall Green The Advertiser, 1 April 1975

Jim Hyde
January 1979.

Address: "MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND BIG POWER INTERESTS IN THE REGION" -Kate Short (co-author of "Transnational Corporations in S.E. Asia and the Pacific"). (Synopsis)


Many of the papers to be presented at this conference are very specific in content and will give participants a chance to acquaint themselves with the finer detail of a wide range of contemporary events in South-East Asia. This address, however, offers a more general view, a jumping-off point if you like, of the current economic and political situation in the region. This in turn may not be adequately achieved without recognising from the start that basic to any correct analysis of corporate activity and big power interests in the region, is the recognition that imperialism is the primary, indeed the dominant force shaping political and economic life in South-East Asia. Clearly, in the region we are witnessing great economic changes which some more gullible of the academic and research community will hail as the "development" of the region - one more step in the inevitable progression towards affluence. The more astute observer, however, cannot fail to see that despite the spread of the capitalist mode of production into some sectors of the economy, despite the development of an industrial base increasing technological complexity and the growth of an urban working class, - despite these and other complementary developments, it is clear that the gap between the rich and the poor is widening rather than lessening, and that very serious economic problems are beginning to mature and impress upon the economies of the region.

The global restructuring of capital, following the most recent crisis of world capitalism, is one whose effects on South-East Asia are profound in both the political and the economic sense. The penetration of the economies of South-East Asia by foreign capital is of course not new. But whereas in the past capital inflow did not result in the spread of the capitalist mode of production, but merely the creation of "enclaves", the inflows in the sixties and the seventies are such that both the economy and society are gradually transformed so that capitalist social relations and relations of production become increasingly dominant. Thus corporate activity in the region must be assessed within this context. It is not enough to know which corporations are doing what and where, although it is important. It is essential as well to recognise the wider economic, social and political effects of corporate activity, and to be aware that in South-East Asia we are witnessing a partial industrialisation under the direct stimulus of foreign capital inflow. This industrial growth is hailed by conventional economists as proof of "development", but it correctly must be seen as proof of the development of underdevelopment:- Of the industrialisation of a region in the interests of, and by stimulus from, international capital.

This is of course achieved through actual investment by corporations in industrial activity, and it is in part the objective of the address to offer some detail as to the source and nature of the most important inward capital flows. To this end, Japanese and US private capital investment will be examined as well as some detail given on bilateral aid from these two countries. Although inflows of capital do assist the growth of the industrial base, it

is also clear from observation that this does not mean the development of the national economy as a separate strong and independent unit. Indeed it necessitates its opposite. Rather than assisting the growth of the national economy, and its progress toward industrial maturity of the type common in the west, foreign capital penetration brings the economies of the region even more tightly into the international capitalist structure, and ensures that their industrial growth is that which assists the corporations to get even stronger at the expense of local firms.

The corporations are assisted in this by the international financial institutions - the World Bank, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank. Indeed, they have a vital role to perform, since through their power over aid and loans, these institutions wield enormous influence over the internal economic policies of the countries of the region. It must be noted, however, that these institutions are finally controlled by the Japanese and American interests, and operate in the countries of the region with their best interests always in mind. Their job is to ensure that the domestic economies of the poor countries develop in such a way as to ensure the continued or increased profitability of international capital. A good example is the role of the World Bank in Indonesia and in the Philippines, where domestic economic policies allow the unrestricted inflow of foreign capital under highly favourable conditions, and as well insist on the strict control of organised labour and its ruthless exploitation.



Although the bulk of this address will be devoted to the economic aspects of imperialist domination in South-East Asia, it may not exclude some comments on the political ramifications of this unequal and essentially exploitative relationship between international capitalism and poor country economies. Economic control is effected by both direct and indirect means, the latter being in an important way played out by the post colonial state. Corporations and the big powers in the region, not only directly control huge quantities of the economic resources of the region, particularly in strategic areas, they also, through their peculiar relationship with the post colonial state exercise immense power, or cause it to be exercised on their behalf. This relationship between foreign capital and the state on poor countries helps to explain not only why the position of foreign capital in the region is so strong, it also assists in an understanding of internal political events, like martial law in the Philippines, the repression of the organised labour movement and the growing indigenous opposition within these countries to the extremely pro-foreign capital stand of the governments.


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Workshop:

"FOREIGN MILITARY BASES IN AUSTRALIA" -Rita Helling (Lecturer,
Philosophy Department, Flinders University).

There are over thirty foreign military bases in Australia. Most of them are American, though there are a few British, French and one Russian base included in that number. The exact number of bases is not easy to establish as some of them are very minor, little more than wheel tracks in the sand. Most people also make a distinction between military functions and scientific research, but I don't think this is a real distinction, because science is never very far from practical military applications. This is why I include the Russian "scientific" base in Tasmania as really a military base.

The major bases are those at Pine Gap, North-West Cape, Nurrungar, Woomera, but even more important will be the base being built at Gippsland in Victoria, the Omega base. The bases have a variety of functions, some of which we don't even know about. The North-West Cape base (named after our late lamented leader, Harold E. Holt) sends out low frequency signals which can be picked up by submarines under water, so that they can fix their position without surfacing. This is similar to what the Omega base will do, but the North-West Cape base is not in the best position. The Omega base will complete a circle of these bases around the world so that the nuclear subs will be able to fix their position wherever they are in the world. Some minor stations such as Smithfield have a complementary function; they are satellite tracking stations, and they enable the subs to fix their positions much more accurately every now and then by coming to the surface. Just from that brief description of two functions of the bases, you can see how they serve the American war machine. As to Pine Gap, we don't know much about what it does. There have been various rumours and stories about what goes on there, e.g. that there is a nuclear reactor there, that a large percentage of U.F.O. sightings occur on a flight path from Pine Gap to Guam, that American nuclear waste is being buried in the desert near Pine Gap, and so on.



Map showing some of the foreign
military bases in Australia



Map showing all the foreign
military bases in the U.S.A.

J. D.

from RETRIEVAL Feb 1974

It's been a fiction from the very beginning that these bases have any protective value at all. All they protect is America's interests. Apart from the fact that it's hard to see how they could prevent or delay an invasion of Australia, it seems unlikely that the Americans would use them to protect Australia. There simply are no protective facilities there anyway. They lie open to sabotage or destruction, as the demonstrators to the North-West Cape base in 1974 quickly found out. It was no problem to get into areas of the base, or to carry out some sabotage, so how could they protect themselves against some really serious threat. It's for this reason that they make Australia so vulnerable. Each one of those bases is a nuclear target. In an Australian-American Association publication we find the purpose of the North-West Cape described:

"With the development of the inter-continental ballistic missiles and of nuclear-powered submarines carrying missiles with limited range, it was essential for the United States to establish land bases to communicate with Polaris submarines in the Indian Ocean. These would bring parts of the Soviet Union and the Sinkiang Province of Communist China within missiles range (a double-edged process), and at the same time counteract the presence of a Soviet submarine fleet in the Indian Ocean". (N. Harpur, "The American Alliance", in Pacific Orbit. Australian-American Association, Cheshire, 1968, p.15).

In this same book it is admitted that the North-West Cape base is a planned target for Soviet and Chinese nuclear missiles, and also that the satellites and satellite-tracking stations have a military role and are for "surveillance" of enemy territory as well as to aid positioning of Polaris and Poseidon submarines so they can aim their missiles accurately.

The presence of these bases in Australia must be considered in the context of what else is happening in the world. The Soviet Union is expanding into many areas, and particularly around the Indian Ocean. There are bases in India and Ceylon, and it is partly to counter this threat that the United States has been so insistent on building the Omega base here. Because we've been so subservient to the Americans, any enemy of theirs constitutes a threat to us. While the Soviet Union has been increasing its strength militarily over the past few years, it still isn't economically anywhere near as strong as the U.S. This makes it unlikely to attack the U.S. directly, and that makes it all the more likely to attack subsidiary powers attached to the U.S. - us. I think the Russians are quite likely to cause a major war, simply because they don't have the economic power to take over some areas without fighting, and it's undeniable that they've been taking over areas wherever they can. They've established positions in African countries, as well as the Indian Ocean, quite apart from their domination of Eastern Europe. So we can't expect them to be passive, and in particular the bases here constitute a real threat to them, because they are so vital to America's system of aggression and domination.

Australian governments have been notoriously servile to American interests as far as the bases are concerned. Liberal governments gave every encouragement to them (not that any was needed), and told lies about them, when they said anything at all about them. We heard a lot about how Whitlam was going to have 'joint control' by Australians with the Americans in the bases, when he was campaigning and then when he got elected, it all collapsed like a balloon once he got into power. The Americans have always and still do exactly what they like on the bases. The bases have been placed on alerts during Middle East crises, and have been used

in the bombing of North Vietnam by the Americans, all without the knowledge of the governments at the time. This sort of thing makes nonsense of any moves towards neutrality in conflicts that Australian governments might make. And Whitlam simply backed down on his promises to do something about it. Even his dismissal of Stallings, the CIA man concerned with Pine Gap, which was one of the factors in the Kerr coup, was inadvertent. So there is absolutely nothing we can expect from any capitalist government. We have to do something about the bases ourselves.

Since 1974 there has been an effective movement against the bases. The Campaign Against Foreign Military Bases in Australia was initiated just prior to the bus trip (the Long March) to the North-West Cape base. There were over 200 people on that particular demonstration, proving that at the time people were prepared to give it a lot of support. The people were mainly lefties, but there was quite a mixture of other types, e.g. a priest who 'exorcised' the base from the evil spirits (the Americans).

Since that time there have been trips to Pine Gap, and Nurrungar; mainly from South Australia, and quite a few demonstrations and events concerned with the Omega base in Gippsland. Our protests about the Smithfield satellite tracking station caused quite



a lot of publicity (and lies) about the function of the base and who is supposed to control it. On the whole the Campaign has increased many people's knowledge of the bases and why they constitute a threat to us. It didn't actually succeed in getting rid of any bases, of course, and this may be one of the reasons for its gradual demise. Protests in other countries have actually succeeded in getting rid of bases. In New Zealand the strong protest movement there forced the Americans to abandon their plan to build Omega there, and bring it here to Australia. Demonstrations in Europe, particularly West Germany, have succeeded in getting plans for nuclear reactors abandoned. The time seems perfect for getting Omega stopped. There are many people who have been involved in the bases campaign, and many others who now recognise its importance. Public knowledge and acceptance of the dangers of the bases is at a much higher level than before 1974. So it should be possible to build a really big protest movement against Omega. There is still an active movement in Victoria, in fact there is a demonstration against Omega taking place this week-end. But the campaign has virtually ceased to exist in South Australia. We need to analyse why this has happened and work out the importance of a campaign against the bases in a programme of revolutionary action for Australian independence and socialism.

WORKSHOP SESSION

"PACIFIC RIM STRATEGY" - Jim Hyde and Laurel Black (Politics Dept.,
Adelaide University) (Synopsis)

It is important that events in South-East Asia are not seen as isolated incidents, but as inter-related parts of an overall strategy. That strategy - not conspiracy - is known for the region as the Pacific Rim Strategy. It is part of the world-wide phenomenon of imperialism. Initially in the Pacific Basin as elsewhere, there was strong emphasis on the military to ensure the integration of Third World states into the capitalist arena. This has changed in two ways, especially since the victories of the Indo-Chinese. Less obvious reliance is placed on military methods of securing the region by the U.S., and more on economic penetration and integration. Where military muscle is needed, regional powers undertake the fighting backed heavily nonetheless by military aid and assistance from the U.S. - notably East Timor.

The U.S. is pursuing the Pacific Rim Strategy through "internationalization" via "regional development" of the Pacific Basin. Within a three tier strategy the U.S. and Japan sit at the apex; supporting them are Australia, New Zealand and Canada. As nations of the second tier it is their role to act as markets and important secondary bases for investment and expansion into the countries of the third tier; Third World states of the region. Because of their underdevelopment these countries - as they rapidly become U.S. and Japanese neocolonies - have an enormous growth potential. A further facet of the situation which is of no less significance lies in their possession of large quantities of raw materials needed by first tier nations.

Australia's perception of its national interests in the context of the East Timor situation were regarded within the broader areas of continued maintenance of regional stability. That regional stability is a necessary precondition for the continued functioning of the Pacific Rim Strategy is a fact endorsed by the extent of United States and Australian endorsement of Indonesia's objective of regional hegemony, a by-product of which is the role of enforcer of regional stability.

There are some important factors to be recognised in relation to the Pacific Rim Strategy. First as I stressed at the beginning of the paper, it is a theory formulated to explain imperialism - which is a world-wide phenomenon - in the Pacific Basin, and as such it should be recognised that there are external factors which impinge upon it. Some of these may be the role of capitalist powers which are not part of the region as such, or the role of non-aligned or other Third World states in supporting the various liberation movements which exist in the third tier nations of South-East Asia and the Pacific. Second, within the Strategy there is the continual possibility for change. It should not be seen as being fixed, as events in the past in relation to Japan's position have shown. Unfortunately, the use of a spatial metaphor in relation to the Strategy does encourage the idea of inflexibility in the theory, but if this disadvantage is recognised, the advantages of its use to

explain simply and clearly the complexities of imperialism in the region can be fully realised. Third, this paper does not make as much as it might of the existence of inter-imperialist rivalry between the U.S. and Japan. Within the region this is of crucial importance, especially given Japan's massive trade surplus, the weakness of its economic base in relation to raw materials, and the growing moves of the U.S. to force Japan back into a more favourable position vis-a-vis the U.S. Of growing importance too, is the entry of West Germany into the region as a supplier of capital and technology with the concomitant real possibility that the rivalries of Western Europe between the U.S., Japan and the EEC will assume increasing importance in the Pacific Basin.


Perhaps the most important factors affecting the Pacific Rim Strategy in the immediate future are the recent events in China and Indo-China, particularly in Vietnam. The opening up of both countries to foreign investment by the capitalist superpowers will mean at least a capital drain away from South-East Asia as available investment resources are redirected to new, and potentially more lucrative projects. Rivalry between China and Vietnam presents the possibility of the growth of a new trading block within the region as well as a fundamental re-alignment within the Pacific Rim Strategy. China's growing relations with the U.S., and Vietnam's commercial relations with Japan, together with the overtures made by each to the ASEAN nations, will be increasingly important in the region in the future.

It is obvious from the policies pursued by the present Australian Government, that Australia has recognised that changes are imminent in the Pacific Basin. Australia has courted the Chinese and cooled relations with Vietnam, to which it has suspended all forms of aid. Clearly the Government is pursuing policies which it believes will enable Australia to retain its position within the Pacific Rim Strategy in the event of major changes in relations in the region.

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**theme: EAST TIMOR AND WEST PAPUA
NEW GUINEA.**



Address: "THE EAST TIMOR PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION -
RESISTANCE, REVOLUTION AND LIBERATION" - Denis Freney
(Secretary, CIET Sydney).

While much has been written on East Timor up to December 7, 1975, little if anything has been written on the struggle that has occurred since then. With the exception of reports on the Indonesian atrocities in the past three years, there has been no consistent attempt made to really analyse the struggle of the Maubere people over the past three years - surely a struggle that must enter into the annals of the history of the past decades, as one of the most tenacious and difficult we have yet seen in the Colonial Revolution.

As a result, much that has been written by journalists and others since December 1975, has been through the prism of what they saw before the invasion. This includes their analysis of individuals and political forces at play. Yet, just as it would be impossible to analyse what occurred between April 1974 and December 1975 in East Timor, through the prism of journalistic observation before April 1974, so it is really impossible to really understand the current situation in East Timor without analysing as deeply as possible the evolution since the fullscale Indonesian invasion.

There are of course major difficulties in doing that. East Timor has been blockaded by Suharto's forces since December 1975. No independent observer has entered the country and the few journalists have only been allowed to go on a guided tour with one exception lasting only 24 or 48 hours. Naturally, those who have gone on these guided tours have produced virtually nothing of value in terms of independent observation.

That leaves three sources: the most valuable is the result of three years of two-way and one-way radio contact with Fretilin. The second most valuable comes from reports of refugees who left the country after the invasion, and from letters smuggled out from Dili to the outside world. But these sources are usually both anti-Fretilin and anti-Indonesian, while also having limited access to events in the mountains. The third source is Indonesian propaganda - itself usually so blatant and self-contradictory that it must be totally discarded. But, as with any propaganda, the internal contradictions it contains are themselves useful in getting a view of what is really happening.



THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The East Timorese Revolution cannot be understood unless it is placed in an international context. That context includes both the global context - the contradictions between imperialism and those countries which have abolished capitalism, and the contradictions among the countries which have abolished capitalism - and the specific regional context in which East Timor exists and the specific ideological-political influences which affected it as a Portuguese colony.

In the global context, East Timor's political awakening occurred in the final death agony of imperialism in Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos. American imperialism was both seriously weakened by its humiliating defeat, but equally determined to crush any sign of rebellion. For some time it had been sponsoring its agent-regimes as "strong men" able to intervene, now that it was politically impossible to send in the marines and B-52s any more. In west Asia and the Middle East there were Iran and Israel. In South-East Asia, Indonesia was the logical choice as gendarme.

It was in this context that Suharto was encouraged to invade East Timor. In the literature dealing with American imperialism's role in East Timor, there has been a passive noting that Ford and Kissinger were in Jakarta a few days before the invasion, and that America has been the major supplier of military hardware for the Indonesian aggression. Generally, there has been a "journalistic" failure to draw the conclusion that is clear: the invasion of East Timor was an act of aggression inspired and totally supported by American imperialism, which fitted into its post-Vietnam strategy of using its puppets to crush liberation movements wherever they may develop; of Asians fighting Asians -- with the oppressors armed with American military hardware.

The Fretilin Central Committee has always been very clear in identifying imperialism and above all American imperialism as the main enemy, with Suharto's regime as its willing and bloodthirsty puppet. It is time that this conclusion was clearly spelt out in the solidarity movement as well, and an end made to attempts to put a gloss on this easily established fact. American imperialism's support for Suharto was no mistake, anymore than Carter's support for the bloody-handed Shah is or was a "mistake". Both fit within imperialism's strategy and are not due to the decision of one group of "badies" in the State Department or Pentagon going against the "humanitarian" policies of Carter....

The East Timorese Revolution has also been the victim of the contradictions which have reached explosion point between China and the Soviet Union; between Vietnam and Kampuchea in South-East Asia. I do not intend to go here into the rights and wrongs of these contradictions, or say which country has been more guilty.

It is sufficient to note that the dictators of South-East Asia -- Suharto, Marcos, the Thai Generals, Lee and Onn -- who were shaking in their shoes after imperialism's defeat in Vietnam and Kampuchea, have been the real winners from the explosive contradictions existing between the Soviet Union and China, and between Vietnam and Kampuchea and the interplay of these contradictions. All parties concerned have launched a great competition to woo these dictatorships, and the Suhartos and others have been able to exploit these contradictions.

After the defeat of imperialism in Indochina, the East Timorese people had the right to expect the fullest possible support from all the countries who were anti-imperialism. True, all the nations concerned have voted with East Timor in the United Nations and to different

degrees given moral, diplomatic and political support. But too often this has been dictated in its degree by the diplomatic considerations in South-East Asia vis-a-vis the attitude Suharto has taken to the Sino-Soviet-Vietnam-Kampuchean contradictions.

Similarly, the East Timorese people should have been able to expect solidarity and support from the Portuguese Government(s) following the overthrow of fascism in April 1974. But, despite the "decolonisation" declarations of the successive governments since April 1974, the East Timorese people have been betrayed at each step by regimes who showed no interest in East Timor except to disengage as quickly as possible and even acquiesce in the Indonesian takeover (despite diplomatic protests). Sadly, this applied even to the most leftist of those governments, for whom the plea of over-involvement in Africa and at home is no excuse.

In Australia, the East Timorese people could equally have expected support from the first Labor Government in 23 years. But, on the contrary, they were shamefully betrayed by Whitlam in particular. There is no need to repeat the disgusting story of this betrayal -- it is well documented now. It must also be said that the Australian Left has no excuse in pleading the crisis that developed here in 1975, for its lack of stronger action in those days.



Melbourne Age, 8/9/77

It was only in the former Portuguese colonies in Africa that the East Timorese people found their true friends and comrades-in-arms. But in Mozambique, Angola Guine-Bissau and so on, the final stage of the revolution was only being achieved, and their possibilities for action were severely limited. It was only after the invasion that these comrades-in-arms could more fully mobilise their still limited resources.

Of course, there were in Fretilin's diplomacy in the period of April 1974 to December 1975, many deficiencies. In the main, this was due to the speed with which the situation developed. It was only 16 months after the formation of ASDT-Fretilin that the UDT staged its coup and 17 months after the start that Fretilin was in full control of the country. That is a very, very short time to develop an international diplomacy able to meet the needs of the invasion to come.

But there were other factors : the influence of the conservative wing of Fretilin was dominant in this diplomacy and was centred on the need to win Australia to a position of support for East Timor's right to independence. When it became clear -- very early -- that Whitlam had sold out to Suharto, this conservative diplomatic line turned to the Liberal-Country Party Opposition as its mainstay, and particularly upon that hypocritical little man, Andrew Peacock. Peacock's advice was, naturally, to trust him, and to not turn to the natural allies of the East Timorese people, and, above all, to reassure Suharto with promises for instance to follow ASEAN foreign policy.

The hypocritical reassurances of Peacock led to illusions that Indonesia would not openly invade, but would continue the border war for some time. Valuable time was lost, and that despite the initiatives of Nicolau Lobato in visiting Mozambique and Portugal, in an attempt to widen the diplomatic front. This did not negate what we said earlier : it was the conservative wing of Fretilin that determined the main line of foreign policy and diplomatic efforts towards (of all people) Andrew Peacock, and the continuing efforts of this conservative wing to dovetail Fretilin's foreign policy with Australia -- and Indonesia. In other words, the conservatives' control of Fretilin diplomatic efforts was used in an effort to foist on Fretilin a neo-colonial solution -- an effort that in turn negated the mass line and revolutionary policy Fretilin was adopting internally. It was only after the invasion that Fretilin's diplomatic orientation turned to its natural allies -- after the most favourable period (Fretilin's control of the whole country) had changed.

To sum up : what seemed to be a highly favourable international context in 1974-75, turned out to be an illusion. The East Timorese people have had to fight on their own resources, with solidarity greatly limited on all fronts. Essentially, the disappointments with the international context were not of Fretilin's making, despite mistakes made before and since. There is no doubt that the failure of the superficially favourable international context to provide the support initially hoped for, was, initially, at least, a blow to the East Timorese people. But it is a blow they have survived and as early as March 1976, the Supreme Council of Struggle adopted a policy of total self-reliance, of counting on their own resources. This is a slogan often voiced by liberation movements and of course in all cases has a basis of truth : no nation has ever won its liberation from outside alone and not through its own efforts. But never -- to my knowledge -- has a movement and a whole people had to apply the slogan of self-reliance so totally as have the East Timorese people. Of course, their astonishing success in the past three years and their continuing success despite all the difficulties will bring the possibilities of them not having to be so totally self-reliant closer in the future...

In such a situation, of total self-reliance, the different lines among the Fretilin Central Committee which in the pre-invasion period were contained within a certain division of labour and a democratic process of decision-making which led to a united front, became clear and antagonistic in the post-invasion period.

THE TWO LINES WITHIN FRETILIN

Despite the clearly stated policy for total independence, there existed inside Fretilin leadership from the beginning a minority, conservative wing which never really believed that the Maubere people could win total independence from imperialism and Suharto's fascist-military clique. For this group, the strategy was always to attempt

to win Fretilin to acceptance of East Timorese "independence" being that of a "client State", whose independence would be as real as that of Bhutan from India.

The aim of making East Timor a "client State" was also that of a strong wing of Australian mini-imperialism, represented by the Defence Department and JIO. The clearest exponent of this line was Peter Hastings (who has unashamedly admitted in the Sydney Morning Herald of January 1, 1979 that he held this as the best alternative). A "client State" is in fact the most extreme form of neo-colonialism which denies the "client" even the semblance of independence in anything but name. From the earliest days of ASDT, the conservative wing of that organisation proposed concessions to Indonesia in the form of economic and foreign policy which added up to an acceptance of a "client State" status. Later this was broadened to try to entice Australia to join Indonesia as the masters of this puppet "independent" State.

On the other hand, the revolutionary majority of Fretilin Central Committee after the transformation of ASDT into Fretilin, had the front adopt a clear-cut policy opposing neo-colonialism and of struggling for total independence. This line was confirmed in the May 76 meeting of the Supreme Council of Struggle and has been reiterated at all such meetings since.

It is in that sense that we must understand the rejection of "negotiations" by the Fretilin Central Committee. Let us state quite clearly that those in the conservative minority of Fretilin CC have all understood "negotiations" as meaning a "compromise" in which East Timor would accept a "client State" status. This was so for the Xavier do Amaral group and was even more clearly so for Alarico Fernandes and his group. The debate about "negotiations" inside Fretilin throughout the past three years has revolved not around the use of "negotiations" for diplomatic purposes, to divide the enemy and put them diplomatically on the defence, while refusing to "compromise" on the demand for total independence. This, of course, is the way "negotiations" were carried out by the liberation movements in the former Portuguese colonies and by the Vietnamese.



FRETILIN leaders addressing an East Timor National Activists' Conference, Melbourne, Australia in early 1976.

But in East Timor, the debate on "negotiations" was really a debate on whether Fretilin accept a "compromise" and a "client State" status, or whether they fight on to final victory. Both sides -- the conservative and revolutionary wings -- understood the debate in those terms. The slogan "negotiations never" meant for both sides a rejection of neo-colonial solutions : and that is why Xavier and then Fernandes staged their attempted coups -- to prepare the way for a neo-colonial solution.

In the outside world, and in the solidarity movements, the clear position of Fretilin CC on "negotiations" has been misunderstood. Some have attempted to present the CC position as "ultra-left". They have attempted to present the question as an abstract, "theoretical" one, while ignoring the very real struggle inside Fretilin and how the question of "negotiations" was interpreted by both sides. As in any such debate, which reached explosive points, the debate is never an abstract or "theoretical" one, but deeply reflects the basic questions posed for the Revolution : to surrender or to fight for final victory.

In the solidarity movements, we must also ask those who have taken the side of "negotiations" in the debate within Fretilin : are you supporting "negotiations" because you believe that the East Timorese people cannot win total independence, and that a "client State" status is all that can be won, short of total integration in Suharto's empire? Do you support "negotiations" and a "compromise" (neo-colonial) solution for "humanitarian reasons", to stop the genocide Suharto has unleashed against the East Timorese people?

I believe that, in fact, these are the reasons many have supported a "compromise" solution. Many people oppose Suharto's invasion for humanitarian reasons, and that is natural and in part at least correct. The same happened of course in the big movement in Australia and around the world in opposition to American aggression in Vietnam and Kampuchea. With Vietnam, the desire to stop the genocide was a deep and correct feeling among the masses around the world who opposed the American war. But what was the answer? Was it to demand that the Vietnamese people surrender or accept to be a "client State" of American imperialism? Or was it to respect (and support) the right of the Vietnamese people to fight for their independence, despite the terrible cost inflicted on them by American imperialism, and to demand instead that American and Australian troops withdraw from Vietnam and end their "Vietnamisation" of the war? To my knowledge no one raised the demand that the Vietnamese people stop fighting and accept a neo-colonial solution -- no one, that is, except the Pentagon and the Thieu regime.

The Vietnamese, Kampuchean and Laotian people, like the Mozambican, Angolan and Guinean people paid a terrible price, in terms of human lives and physical and ecological destruction, for their independence. Similarly, imperialism and the Suharto military-fascist regime is imposing a terribly high cost on the East Timorese people for their independence. Who has the right to tell the East Timorese people not to fight?

In fact, the enemies of the East Timorese people interpret every sign of a desire for a "compromise", neo-colonial solution, as a sign of weakness, including when it comes from the supporters of the East Timorese people. The surrender of Xavier do Amaral and Alarico Fernandes in fact prolong the war, because they boost the morale of the Indonesian troops, who begin again to believe that the "end of the tunnel" is in sight, and the resistance will collapse. The Maubere people will pay with thousands more dead for their betrayal.

Yet those who support the right of the East Timorese people to fight for total independence are sometimes accused of wanting to fight to the last Timorese, and of being fanatical. Let us be very clear : the Maubere people themselves have decided that they will fight for "independence or death" -- their decision was not and is not made in Sydney or anywhere else. The Maubere people have accepted the terrible cost they are being forced to pay, rather than live in slavery under Suharto. They are not the first people to have made such a decision, and they will not be the last. Objectively, not to support their decision is to increase the suffering and the cost in lives they will have to pay. To support the traitors who want a neo-colonial solution inside Fretilin is in fact to prolong the war. As for being "fanatical" if to do everything possible to support the East Timorese people, to support their rejection of neo-colonialism or surrender, is fanatical, then so be it. Indeed, it seems to me that the "fanaticism" often comes from the other side of the debate....

to be "fanatical" is to be irrational, to not study a question deeply, and to blindly follow an "ideological" position, without consideration of the human aspects involved. It is my belief, that the revolutionary position is, in this case, the really "humanitarian" position ; it is the rational position.

I shall deal with the question of whether the East Timorese people can win their struggle for total independence later in this paper when I consider the perspectives of the Maubere Revolution.

THE STRUGGLE IN THE LIBERATED AREAS:

As I have stated, there have been two fundamentally opposed lines within Fretilin Central Committee, and these two lines have increasingly over the past three years come into conflict over the question of whether to fight for final and total victory, or to accept a neo-colonial solution. In the two major explosions of the contradictions between these two lines, the revolutionary line has on both times been victorious, and the "conservative win" leaders (Xavier do Amaral and Alarico Fernandes) have been forced to recognise the reality of their line's logic: to total surrender.

To understand the evolution of this internal struggle in the liberated areas, it is necessary to look at the main outlines of the revolutionary resistance offered by the East Timorese people in the past three years.

In some respects, the East Timorese people were in a stronger position at the beginning of the invasion, than liberation movements in other countries have been when they began guerilla wars. First, Fretilin had total control of the whole country. It had captured (captured - not surrendered by the Portuguese) the substantial arsenal of the Portuguese colonial army. They had at least a skeleton administrative structure operating. Thus the invaders were entering a terrain they did not know, and the positions were reversed when compared, for example, with Mozambique, where the Portuguese fascists were "in place", and FRELIMO had to begin the reconquest of their country from small bases.

Of course, the overwhelming military superiority of the Indonesian invaders enabled them to capture Dili, Baucau and some of the other main administrative centres (which however had a low population) within a relatively short period - by mid-1976, they had captured a dozen such small towns. However, Fretilin not only maintained near total control of the countryside where 90% of the population lived, but also threw cordons around the isolated Indonesian outposts, and

on many occasions forced the Indonesians to pull out. The first six months were crucial: Fretilin and Falintil were able to organise a stable resistance and stabilised liberated areas which in fact took over 80% of the country. Falintil established its "front lines" surrounding the Indonesian outposts and protecting these liberated areas, where life was able to proceed with some normality and the revolutionary organisation of the masses for production, self-defence and education and health was able to develop with the necessary speed.

At the end of 1976 and the beginning of 1977, Suharto's forces launched a number of desperate and large-scale offensives, which aimed at destroying key liberated areas. But Fretilin, with amazing success, defeated these offensives. As a result, from approximately March to September 1977 Suharto's forces were forced to abstain from any large-scale attacks, and were content with small scale raids which met fierce resistance. At the same time, they stepped up air raids on the liberated areas, with the strategy of destroying food crops, massacring the civilian population and destabilising the liberated areas. Yet it can be said that until September 1977, the Indonesians had suffered a major and demoralising defeat: they were unable to end their isolation in a dozen small towns, or break Fretilin control of the vast liberated areas and the vast majority of the population.

It is convenient therefore to divide the struggle and resistance in East Timor into the two periods of December 1975 to September 1977, and of September 1977 to the present. September 1977 is a turning point in a number of respects: it marks the arrest of Xavier do Amaral by Fretilin and the defeat of his attempted coup, and secondly, marks the beginning of Suharto's new offensives which are described by Fretilin as "campaigns of encirclement and annihilation". These campaigns aimed at encirclement of liberated areas and the systematic destruction of crops and of the civilian population.

But first let us look at developments in the liberated areas from December 1975 to September 1977. Alarico Fernandes failed over a period of three years to give anything but the most general outline of the situation in the liberated areas. However, the best source is the speech of President Nicolau Lobato on September 14, 1977, after the arrest of Xavier do Amaral. This speech is an excellent source because a picture emerges of the life in the liberated areas incidental to the main theme of the speech.

First, it should be noted that security was strong within the liberated zones. For example, the meeting of the top Fretilin leadership - The Supreme Council of Struggle and the Political Committee, took place in Soibada from May 20 to June 2, 1976. The same bodies held a joint meeting in Lalini from March 8 to May 20 1977 -- in other words, major leaders of Fretilin were able to meet for nearly three months in full security, to discuss the development of the struggle. (Another major meeting of these two bodies occurred in October 1977, which elected President Nicolau Lobato and Vice President Mau-Lear to head Fretilin. Details of the length and place of this meeting has not yet been released).

Second, movement around the country, from one liberated area to another, was safe and relatively easy. Xavier do Amaral was condemned for his "visits to festivities with big noise and big banquets: long voyages in cavalcade with the noise of numerous guards and opportunists and hangers-on, authentic parasites who lived off the people everywhere; big colonial-style dances, lasting all night and sometimes all week..." While President Nicolau

Lobato was of course absolutely correct in condemning this feudal-colonial style of living, the fact that Xavier do Amaral was able, as a person not noted for his courage, to act in this way, shows the degree of security in this period, in the liberated areas.

Third, production was well organised in this period. Seed grains were distributed throughout the country from a central point and according to an organised plan. Xavier do Amaral was accused of seizing seed grain being sent to other sectors and of boycotting plans to mobilise the population for production as decided by the Permanent Committee of Fretilin CC in September 1976. Fernandes in May 1977 reported that the harvest over the previous year had exceeded any previous harvest in the colonial history of East Timor. Production was organised through co-operatives and the collective labour of the whole population in the liberated areas.

Fourth, Fretilin organised the "political, military and technical organisation, modernisation and training of Falintil" in this period, to better prepare it to defend and extend the liberated areas. Front lines were organised around the Indonesian garrisoned small towns, and anyone crossing these lines had to produce authorisation from Fretilin. Falintil was shaped into a regular army, with special units or "shock brigades".

Fifth, Fretilin campaigned against the remnants of feudalism and obscurantism in the liberated areas - the lulics, arranged marriages, lurais, tribalism and regionalism; feudal servitude - and the colonial practices of subservience to "big men" and so on.

Sixth, organisational work included efforts to replace supplies cut off by the blockade and invasion: sugar was grown and processed - it was on display at the May 1976 meeting. Traditional medicines were developed and researched to replace medical supplies cut off from the liberated areas. Gunpowder and mines were produced from raw materials in the liberated areas. Education continued, using the most basic materials. Printing facilities were developed, including for leaflets and booklets in Bahasa Indonesia for circulation among Indonesian troops.

In short, despite the boycott on information about the organisation of life in the liberated areas, imposed by Alarico Fernandes particularly from mid-1977, a picture emerges from documented material available, of a stable, organised life in the liberated areas, only marginally disturbed by the massive Indonesian military offensives launched in this period.


In September 1977, the Indonesian military began to adopt a new tactic: it concentrated its forces in a small area and began an intensive campaign of "encirclement and annihilation", accompanied with intensive air, land and sea bombardment, aimed at surrounding liberated areas, capturing the civilian population, destroying food crops and stores, and destabilising Fretilin and Falintil organisation in these areas. Helicopters carried troops and heavy artillery on to strategically placed mountain tops, to continuously shell the liberated areas in which they were situated and to "soften up" Falintil for massive infantry and armoured attack.

The first attacks, in early September 1977 were timed to coincide with the planned coup by Xavier do Amaral, which was prevented by his arrest. The first attacks were concentrated in the south border and north border areas. The next offensives occurred in the Centre-North Sector in June 1978 and soon after in the Centre-South and Centre-East Sectors.

On May 20, 1978, President Nicolau Lobato described how the campaigns of encirclement and annihilation in the border sectors were near collapse because of the fierce resistance of hundreds of thousands of Mauberes. Just before exposing his betrayal, and while still in radio contact with Falintil headquarters, Fernandes reported on September 27 that the Indonesians had been forced to withdraw to a few strategic places in the north border sector. The latest news, from a letter smuggled out of Dili, reports fierce fighting recently in the Railaco area, in this north border sector.

What, then, is the situation in East Timor now? It is a fact that the campaigns of encirclement and annihilation have only had success in the Centre-North Sector. This is not accidental. The Centre-North Sector (the area south and east of Dili) was the "feudal fief" of Xavier do Amaral; it was also the scene of Alarico Fernandes' planned counter-revolutionary coup called by him "Operation Skylight". First under Xavier do Amaral and then under Alarico Fernandes this Centre-North Sector has been the scene of all plots hatched against the revolutionary majority of Fretilin CC. It was in this area, and part of the Centre-South Sector that Xavier do Amaral boycotted organisation and production, set up his own feudal-type administration, encouraged obscurantism and regionalism and generally disorganised life so much that it was even then particularly vulnerable to Indonesian attack. There is no reason to believe this changed much under Alarico Fernandes, who himself in the secret Saturno messages admitted his organisation for "Operation Skylight" began in October 1977 - that is, almost immediately after Xavier's arrest.

We must fear then that the situation described by President Nicolau Lobato, as existing in September 1977, had not changed much in the Centre-North Sector by June 1978. The Maubere Revolution, that had swept the remainder of the country and provided the social and political basis for the defeat of the Indonesian offensives in the two border sectors, and which have also been severely checked or even maybe by now defeated in the Centre-South and Centre-East sectors.



The "victories" won by the Indonesians have all occurred in this Centre-North Sector: it was from here that Alarico Fernandes released Xavier do Amaral, as the advance-guard to contact the Indonesians for "Operation Skylight"; it was from this Sector that Alarico Fernandes himself surrendered. And if Indonesian reports are correct (and we strongly doubt them - see note at end of this paper), it was in this sector that Nicolau Lobato was reportedly killed, when he was maybe attempting to reorganise the resistance after the betrayal of Fernandes. Similarly, the many people who have left the mountains and who were before part of the educated elite who supported Fretilin, have come from this Centre-North Sector in their vast majority.

It is clear then that the situation in the Centre-North Sector has deteriorated badly and that it is here, and here alone that the Suharto regime has won its first substantial "victory" since the beginning of the invasion. The "victory" in this sector is not a defeat for the revolutionary line of Fretilin, but rather is an indication that its revolutionary line is an absolute necessity for final victory. It shows that the line of the revolutionary majority of Fretilin CC led by President Nicolau Lobato, Vice-President Mau-Lear and National Political Commissioner Sa'he is the guarantee for victory.

No doubt the resistance will be reconstructed in the Centre-North Sector. No doubt also the Indonesians will have their morale boosted by this victory, which we believe will only prove temporary, although it could have the result of increased military pressure on the Centre-South Sector, where Xavier do Amaral also infected some parts with his feudal and tribalist approach, and where Alarico Fernandes boasted he had sent some of his agents before his surrender. But such defeats and retreats must be expected in a protracted people's war - indeed, it is a sign of the strength of the resistance of the Maubere people and of their Revolution, that it is only now, after three years of war, that the Suharto military have achieved such a "success". But it is a "success" built on clay - a win gained through the political weakness and disorganisation in the Centre-North Sector, and the betrayal of Xavier do Amaral and Alarico Fernandes.

We can expect Suharto's propaganda machine to make much of this very limited "victory". After all, they have been starved of real success in the past, and have been forced to manufacture "victories" and declare repeatedly that Fretilin has been defeated over the past two years. Moreover, the morale of Suharto's troops in East Timor is very low and weariness with the war growing. We can expect fabrications built on the very real difficulties in the Centre-North Sector. The Australian and world capitalist media will print all the Suharto propaganda as gospel truth.

The solidarity movement must "keep its head", avoid the pressure to demoralisation, and remain confident that the struggle continues and that Suharto will finally be forced to withdraw from East Timor. We have the weapon of a concrete, realistic political analysis, towards which, I hope, this paper will be a contribution. Anyone who thinks that revolutionary war proceeds in a straight line to victory without reverses, partial defeats, betrayals and then resurgence, deepening of the revolution and new victories, is living in a dream world.

Revolutionary war, particularly one as difficult as that in East

Timor, is a contradictory and complex phenomenon. Above all, revolutionary war depends on a real, deep Revolution taking place among the broad masses, so that every man and woman becomes a soldier and militant of the revolutionary war, constantly deepening his or her political understanding, and throwing up cadres and leaders from among the Maubere people themselves, able to carry the struggle forward.

That said, I wish to conclude by examining the perspectives of the Maubere Revolution and the possibilities by which Suharto's military-fascist forces can be forced to accept their defeat and withdraw from East Timor.

PERSPECTIVES FOR THE REVOLUTION

I want to first make some comments about the "Revolution" and its perspectives before going on to the more general question of how victory will be won.

As was noted in EAST TIMOR NEWS NO.47 and 48, there has been a profound revolutionary process going on in the liberated areas of East Timor. It began in one sense from the founding of ASDT, then took a leap forward with the transformation of the ASDT into FRETILIN in September 1974 and the adoption of its political programme. Next came the attempted UDT coup in August 1975 and the successful Fretilin counter-offensive, which brought Fretilin into power throughout the country from September 1975 to December 1975, during which period Fretilin had to cope not only with the border incursions by Suharto's troops, but also the complex problems of social, political and economic organisation, which brought forward the embryonic forms which developed after the invasion. The invasion in December 1975 resulted in the first wave of betrayals - the weakest and most corrupt surrendered very soon after the invasion.

The May 1976 meeting of the Supreme Council of Struggle and the Fretilin Political Committee was a decisive meeting, which reaffirmed the determination to continue the struggle to final victory, to reject a "compromise solution", and to proceed with the organisation of the liberated areas for a long, protracted revolutionary people's war. The next meeting from March to May 1977 reaffirmed and deepened these decisions. In October 1977, a second major turning point occurred with the defeat of the Xavier coup attempt and the election of President Nicolau Lobato, Vice-President Mau-Lear and National Political Commissioner Sa'he to head the struggle. The following year saw the further deepening of the revolutionary process in the liberated areas. The question of transforming Fretilin from a movement into a revolutionary party also took shape and it was within this framework of the deepening of the revolution that Alarico Fernandes prepared his coup in the form of "Operation Skylight".

Throughout the past four years, the Maubere people have been fighting not only a war of resistance but also to deepen their Revolution, against the internal reactionaries in the liberated areas. That very clearly shows the dual nature of the struggle of the Maubere people - to defeat the Indonesian fascist aggressors, and to develop their own revolution, in which the exploitation of man by man will be defeated. But these two aspects of the struggle are not independent, but are intertwined. Without the victory of the Revolution in the liberated areas, the aggressors will not be defeated. And of course, without the defeat of the aggressors, the Revolution cannot achieve its full flower. In fact, that is the sense of what we have outlined in the last half of this paper.

There are a number of ways in which we can foresee the final victory of the Maubere people occurring. The Indonesians could be totally defeated militarily as the puppet troops were in Vietnam and Kampuchea. However, Fretilin would have to have heavy and more sophisticated weapons than they do at present, to achieve such a goal. Alternatively, the process could be more like what happened in Mozambique, Angola and Guine-Bissau: Indonesian soldiers and lower-ranking officers could refuse to fight any more in a war which they cannot win in East Timor, and demand to return home, and if that is refused, finally overthrow themselves, or join the masses in overthrowing the Suharto dictatorship. In other words, Suharto could go the same way as Caetano did, and after some attempts by a new regime to salvage a "compromise solution", the unconditional withdrawal of the Indonesian troops from East Timor would be won.

Given the "international context" outlined in the first part of this paper, it is my belief that the second alternative is the more likely one. The Suharto regime, while seemingly having overcome the agitation that occurred early last year, is nevertheless unstable. The worsening economic situation, following the recent 50% devaluation, is an explosive ingredient in the crisis. Previously cautious observers are now tipping Suharto will not last 1979.

Of course, it is not excluded at all, that the CIA will favour a "preventive coup" by another group of Generals who can present themselves as "cleanskins". If that type of coup occurred, there would be no guarantee that the new group of Generals would retreat from East Timor. They would have two alternatives: blame Suharto for invading in the first place contrary to the Indonesian Constitution and seek a "compromise solution" with East Timor as a "client State", or blame Suharto for the mismanagement of the war and promise the soldiers that they will manage it successfully to final victory.

It is for this reason that Suharto and his clique were so jubilant at the claimed murder of Nicolau Lobato. It was to boost morale, to claim a "victory" that Defence Minister General Yusuf flew to Dili to decorate the soldiers who carried out the alleged killing, and to bring back Nicolau Lobato's alleged rifle to the Jakarta Military Museum! It was because the war in East Timor is a thorn in Suharto's flesh that a special nationwide TV broadcast was made immediately the alleged death of Lobato became known in Indonesia.

But Suharto's jubilation will be short-lived. He will learn very soon that the struggle continues. The cannon-fodder in his army will learn that many more thousands of them will have to die in East Timor.

The convergence of the continuing revolutionary war in East Timor, with the upsurge of the mass struggle in Indonesia itself will result in the overthrow of Suharto. The longer time passes before Suharto is removed, the more likely it is that the next regime in Indonesia will be a progressive one, and the order given to withdraw the troops from East Timor. That is why the Americans are preparing a "preventive coup". After all, they have learnt something from Iran. They don't want the streets of Jakarta to be like those in Tehran.

There is no basis for defeatism and demoralisation when we examine the East Timorese Revolution.

Victory is certain and only a matter of time!

ADDRESS: INDONESIA'S ROLE IN EAST TIMOR AND WEST PAPUA-NEW GUINEA

- Keith D. Suter (Senior Tutor, St. Johns College, Sydney University).

Introduction. A secure and stable Indonesia is of "immense and direct concern to Australia", claimed Australian Defence Minister, Jim Killen on October 29, 1978, during a visit to Indonesia. The Australian Government (and Labor Opposition) considers the main theme in its relations with Indonesia is the maintenance of a unified Indonesia.

The purpose of this paper is to ask the question: whose interests are served by there being a strong and stable Indonesia? This Conference is covering a wealth of issues, such as East Timor, West Irian, human rights in the ASEAN countries and implications for Australia from the independence movements. The paper's purpose (a very ambitious one) is to provide, as far as possible, an overview of many issues by seeing how they are all affected by the Indonesian Government's overriding aim of maintaining national unity. The paper aims to be provocative.

The paper begins with an overview of Indonesia's historical background, with particular emphasis being placed on the argument that Indonesia is an accident of history. With a few different colonizing actions by the European colonial powers, Indonesia could be very different from its present form.

The paper's next section looks at who benefits and who does not benefit from there being a strong and stable Indonesia. Caution is required when making this evaluation since it is difficult to generalize. Nonetheless the attempt is made as a way of fostering discussion on a matter to which not enough attention is given: to what extent are Indonesia's human rights violations derived essentially from trying to maintain unity in this island world?

The final section goes even further in terms of scope and provocation by looking more closely at some of the issues raised earlier, especially the notion of the nation-state, the future of national liberation movements and the status of the protection of human rights in the context of international relations.

Indonesia: The Fragmented Giant. National unity is one of Indonesia's main problems. Indeed, the drive for national unity overshadows all of the Indonesian Government's policies. While the decisions to conquer West Irian and East Timor had complex motivations, one of the major ones was the belief that the conquests were necessary in the interests of maintaining national unity.

Indonesia, the world's longest archipelago, consists of about 13,677 islands, strung out like a necklace of emeralds along an east-west axis of about 3,200 miles. It is on the crossroads of history. All the world's major religions (except Judaism) have adherents in these islands. The major religion is Islam, though its adherents are generally less devout than some in the Middle East. The repeated overlays of faiths has tended to weaken the hold of any one single religion so that, for example, each Middle Eastern religion is merged with pre-existing Javanese mysticism and a mixture of Hindu-Buddhism.

Indonesia's religious mixture arose out of its geographical and economic significance. It is astride some of the major waterways in the world and so has been figured in trading arrangements by vessels passing between China, India and Europe. It has also been fabled for its natural resources - the old international reputation of the "Spice Islands" wealth is illustrated by Christopher Columbus' 1492 voyage whereby he ran across the present United States when trying to find a west-about route to the "Spice Islands". The Portuguese and Dutch were the main European nations active in the Indonesian region during the era of imperialism.

It is fascinating to speculate upon how different Indonesia would be today if the colonial powers had adopted other policies. The Dutch gradually pushed Portugal out of this area, with the exception of East Timor, which it held onto for 450 years, when owing to the April 1975 revolution in Lisbon, Portugal's hold was weakened and the province had a brief period of independence, followed by the Indonesian invasion in late 1975. East Timor is the most obvious part of Indonesia to which the Government really has little claim.

West Irian, one-fifth of Indonesia's total land area, is (as Nonie Sharp (1) has reminded us) more Melanesian than Indonesian. Ethnically it should be part of a greater Melanesia, composed of other like-minded nations such as Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. It is part of Indonesia, however, because it was part of the Dutch empire (though administratively separate from it) and so went, after a prolonged period of negotiation and confrontation, to Indonesia. Had the Germans (who took possession of the north-eastern part of New Guinea late last century) been more greedy, they could have taken more of the island, especially since the Dutch were doing little with it except for using it as an island for political prisoners. Similarly the British (who were reluctant to claim the south-eastern part of the island) could have been more eager in their empire-building and taken the western half from the Dutch. As it is, the Germans and British were satisfied with their parts of the island, and the Dutch maintained control over the western part and provided the bridge over which the Indonesian Government travelled to claim West Irian.

If West Irian should really be regarded as part of Melanesia, what about other parts of Indonesia to the east of the Wallace line (2)? Aru, for example, consists of about 99 islands, of which 25 are inhabited, covering a total area of 100 miles by 50 miles (3). The population is about 35,000 (some of whom are from China and other nearby islands) about 70 per cent of whom are Protestant. The Portuguese lost control in 1623 to the Dutch, thereby ensuring their eventual status within the nation-state of Indonesia created formally in 1949. But ethnically they are similar to the New Guineans.

At the other end of Indonesia, there is Aceh on the northern tip of Sumatra, which is composed of some of the most zealous Muslims in the world. It was not until 1903 that the Dutch got formal acknowledgement for its control over this rebellious province, though sporadic rebellions continued this century. The main competitor this time was Britain, which controlled the nearby Malaysia and which in the latter part of last century had reservations about permitting Dutch control. Again it is a matter of speculation what would have happened should Britain have tried to gain control. The province, incidentally, has been almost as unfriendly towards the Indonesian Government as it was towards the

Dutch. The Darul Islam movement in Aceh in the post-independence Indonesia opposed secular Indonesian rule and fought for its point of view until 1963. The province still has some periods of rebellion but is more tranquil since the Government permitted it an unusually large degree of autonomy.

Indonesia can, therefore, be viewed as the island of Java (containing over 70 per cent of the Indonesian population) with satellite islands, some of which have either rebelled or are rebelling against Jakarta rule. Despite being composed of elements of some of the world's oldest civilizations, Indonesia as a nation-state is only 30 years old. I suggest, then, that the previous three decades should be looked upon as a testing period to see whether the nation-state has a future. Other newly independent nations have been subjected to the same test and some have proved not to be viable nation-states, notably Pakistan and the Congo, and have split up; others, like Nigeria, have survived intact. Indonesia varies from most other countries because of the scale and scope of its unity problems.

It has a large number of islands to control, there are few (if any) unifying factors such as religion (4) and the country is plagued with economic problems. Its rate of economic growth has been slow and uneven (with the ruling elite gaining at the expense of the others), with a growing landless population, many of whom are residing in Jakarta (now compared with Calcutta as an urban disaster zone (5)).

It could be asked at this point: given Jakarta's other problems closer to home, why did it take over West Irian and East Timor? Although both provinces may have some economic potential (minerals in West Irian and offshore oil in East Timor's case), an important reason was the need, ironically, to maintain national unity. The Indonesian Governments (both under Sukarno and Suharto) have seen Indonesian rule over these provinces as essential for unity.

In West Irian's case, the Sukarno Government decided that it should get West Irian (whose independence was not granted when the rest of Indonesia was given independence in 1949) from the Netherlands. It also provided a national focal point, external to Indonesia's domestic problems, upon which to arouse patriotic fervour. The Suharto Government (which has recently taken steps to rehabilitate Sukarno's previously denigrated memory) found itself obliged to continue the campaign to gain control over it. It would appear that whatever the ruling elite thought about other aspects of Sukarno's rule (such as his attitude towards the Communist Party of Indonesia), it did approve of Sukarno's West Irian policy. West Irian passed, via United Nations hands, into Indonesian control in 1963 and has been a financial burden. The Government has spent more per capita on development in West Irian than elsewhere in Indonesia and has had to pay its troops who have been fighting the Free Papua Movement. But to withdraw from West Irian would represent a recognition that previous policy was wrong and it would induce other parts of Indonesia to seek independence.

Indonesian claims to East Timor were even weaker than those to West Irian. This has not stopped it however, from breaking international law (6) to gain control over it. A thriving independent East Timor would have indirectly threatened Indonesia. The Democratic Republic of East Timor (DRET), if it had managed to survive, could have flourished and induced the rest of (Indonesian-controlled) Timor to work for independence or perhaps federation with DRET. It would also have provided an example of independence for the rest of Indonesia. Few parts of Indonesia are so materially

backward and yet if DRET had been successful, this would have shown that even a poverty-stricken place like DRET could provide an example in development for other parts of Indonesia. By putting down DRET, the Indonesian Government showed the rest of Indonesia that it was willing to go to great lengths to maintain national unity and so DRET was a lesson for all potential secessionists.

Unfortunately for the Government, this show of force has been marred by the poor performance of its armed forces, which have still not apparently obtained control over all of DRET. Indeed, with the armed force bogged down in the east (both in DRET and West Irian) one wonders whether other parts of Indonesia will take advantage of the situation and step up their campaigns. In attempting to teach DRET a lesson, it is possible that Indonesia has embarked upon a protracted process of disintegration. Having just about survived its first 30 years intact as a nation-state, I doubt if Indonesia can survive another 30.



Who Benefits and Who Does Not? In a paper as brief as this, it is risky to attempt a summing up of who benefits from there being a strong and stable Indonesia, and who does not. However, the summary will be made because the paper is designed to be provocative and to focus attention on the wider context of the East Timor struggle.

The Indonesian People. The Indonesian people have, I believe, derived little benefit from Indonesia as a nation-state. The main exception are, of course, the Javanese, especially the ruling elite (only a few of whom are not Javanese). The rulers have done well out of post-Sukarno Indonesia. It is more difficult to argue that the landless peasants on Java have benefited from the nation-state. But if Indonesia were to fragment, these people will still be left on Java and so the collapse of the present nation may not mean much one way or the other.

The situation is a little clearer outside Java (and Bali). It is evident from the record of anti-Jakarta feeling (often expressed in violence) that these people are dissatisfied with Jakarta rule. Indeed, few other nations have had in recent years such a task in maintaining unity. This does not deny that the Government has been busy trying to instil, via the educational system for instance, a sense of unity. But there is a limit to what cultural factors

can be inculcated into unwilling people and one wonders whether all the Government has managed to do is to put an Indonesianized veneer over pre-existing and still vibrant local cultural patterns and mores (7). There comes a point - and the Government may have reached it - when attempts at maintaining national unity become in themselves counter-productive because the energy expended on this project is less than the benefits flowing from national unity.

Indonesia faces no risk of invasion. Its armed forces are used to maintain national unity (broadly defined to include territorial aggrandizement, of which East Timor was the most recent example), as well as to perform operations which aid the civil community, especially at times of natural disaster. The latter function is a mere by-product of the forces already existing; it could be carried out by other persons not in uniform. In 1977, the armed forces cost US\$1,513 billion or 14.8 per cent of Government expenditure or 3.5 per cent of the GNP (8). Given Indonesia's relatively secure position, that expenditure could be reduced considerably - were it not for the military operations to maintain unity.

This matter of cost is emphasized since it could be argued that despite the Government's other failings (such as having a terrible record on political prisoners (9), it has at least brought western efficiency to a developing country thereby bringing about its economic development. In fact, of course, the economic record is not good (10). The collapse of the Pertamina oil company is a good example. The company overextended itself and moved outside the immediate area of energy matters, it incurred debts to fund projects which would take longer to come to fruition than the period of the loans, and even in its heyday little benefit was going to the average citizen. When the company collapsed in 1975, its debt was larger than the national budget. Indonesia remains the only nation which, at a time of record oil prices, has lost money from having an oil company. The country is recovering from this disaster but the World Bank remains worried about its prospects (11). Its most recent economic jolt was the November 16 1978 devaluation of the rupiah by one-third. Its situation was summed up recently:

Today, only 12 per cent of the land is cultivated. 58 per cent of the country's 135.2 million people are under 21 years old. There are five doctors per 100,000 people, and the average life expectancy is 48 years. 62 per cent of Indonesia's people work in agriculture, 11 per cent in commerce, and 8 per cent in mining and manufacturing. Indonesia exports no manufactured goods, and under Suharto's regime, has become the world's number one rice importer.(12)

This is hardly a description of an economically developed country. Of course, it could be argued that this plight cannot be blamed entirely upon the Government's desire to maintain national unity. But it does raise the question whether the people on the various islands would be better off in smaller units running their own affairs, and receiving foreign aid direct (rather than having it siphoned off into generals' pockets in Jakarta).

The Multinational Corporations. The multinational corporations have done very well out of the nation-state of Indonesia. They have only one central government with which to negotiate. The Government is easy to negotiate with since the Suharto Government has pinned its hopes on western technology, expertise and aid forming the basis of development and this policy exposes it to pressure from western corporations.

It could be argued that a fragmented Indonesia would be an even easier source of plunder for these corporations. We shall see when the federation fragments. In the meantime, I believe that since the corporations are doing so well out of the present Indonesia, it would not necessarily be in their interests to have to deal with smaller units since this could represent a setback from their present advantageous position. Certainly the arms companies would not have such a wide scope for operation if there were not a central government worried about maintaining national unity.

The United States. The United States has a record of propping up the nation-state of Indonesia. Even during the Sukarno era, when Australia, Malaysia and Britain wanted American assistance to defeat the Indonesian "confrontation" with Malaysia, the United States preferred to remain out of the dispute and provided aid to Indonesia.

The United States prefers to have one central government with which to deal. Indonesia is, with the reduction of the U.S.'s Asian military presence, becoming "some kind of policeman in South-East Asia" (13). With the ending of the Vietnam conflict, the U.S. has been pushed back off mainland Asia and relies to a larger extent on nations like Indonesia. As a result, Indonesia took over DRET since there was a risk that it could become another "Cuba", by obtaining aid from the communist countries. This policeman's patrol area extends beyond its own national limits and includes the ASEAN member-states, none of which is anywhere near rivalling Indonesia's influence. This does not imply that Indonesian forces are ready to swoop into any ASEAN member-state which is potentially troublesome; merely that through its influence, it keeps them in line with prevailing U.S. opinion on what ASEAN should do.

A series of independent nations composed out of the present Indonesia would be more difficult for the U.S. to influence simply because they would be more numerous and even able to play off the super powers against one another.

Australia. Australia has always had a love-hate relationship towards Indonesia. The Labor Government in the 1940s was sympathetic to Indonesian nationalist aspirations. But the Menzies Government was worried about Indonesia's West Irian policy and supported continued Dutch control over it throughout the 1950s (one of the few Governments to support the Netherlands). It was worried about the implications of Indonesian control over a province adjacent to Papua New Guinea, over which the Government wished to maintain indefinite control.

The Government was also aware that Indonesians outnumbered Australians by about 10 to 1. The Malaysian "confrontation" experience, along with the reduction in British military installations in Asia, indicated that Australia could have few allies (that is, no American assistance) in the event of there being a "confrontation" against Australia. The Labor Party in the early 1960s shared that fear and supported the purchase of the F111s (which did not arrive for a decade).

It might be thought, then, Australia would welcome the fragmentation of Indonesia into smaller, less threatening nations. But Australia may not necessarily benefit from this development. On the one hand, Indonesia would cease to provide the important functions listed above in the paragraphs dealing with the U.S.

On the other hand, the new nations composed from the Indonesian nation-state could turn to the communist countries for aid, in return for providing bases. Moreover, given Indonesia's strategic position for Japan's seaborne trade, Japan would have to try to influence the new nations as a way of protecting its sea routes and this would bring Japanese military influence closer to Australia's shores.

The Australian Government (both Liberal-Country Party and Labor) has opted for a policy of trying to win over the turbulent giant with financial assistance and military aid to maintain a strong and stable Indonesia, such as helping with the mapping operations in West Irian. It also helps by pressuring Papua New Guinea (which has worries of its own about Indonesia) into not assisting the liberation movement in West Irian. It counts on there not being a major incident in which it will be cornered into opposing Indonesia. It provides no assistance to the West Irian liberation



"Here's another act of free choice — run for your lives or not."

movement and did nothing to stop the Indonesian take over of East Timor.

The Government will eventually be cornered. The most likely scenario will be an increase in the West Irian liberation movement's military activities, a reversal of the late-1978 Indonesian statements about using less force in West Irian and a policy of intensified hot pursuit raids into Papua New Guinea to get the guerilla bases. What will Australia do when Indonesia starts nibbling away at Papua New Guinea territory?

The Wider Context. To continue this line of being provocative about Indonesia, here are three concluding areas of speculation: the temporary nature of nation-states, the end of the era of "national liberation movements" and the significance of human rights in international relations. I have written elsewhere on these matters. Their inclusion here is derived from my concern to try to broaden our consideration of East Timor and to link up some of the points covered earlier.

Nation-States as a Temporary Feature of International Relations.

Throughout this paper, there has been attention on Indonesia as an accident of history, whose present frontiers are derived more from European colonial actions, rather than the espoused desires of the present population. All nation-states are accidents of history. If the Dutch, Spanish or Portuguese had been more enterprising and done more than merely hover around our coasts in times past, then Australia could have been very different from what it is now. It just so happens that the British were not so disenchanted with Australia's bleak and uninviting landscape and decided that it could be of use (especially because the initial white inhabitants were to be persons for whom the landscape was well suited). In this context, I wish to make two points:

Nation-states are not fixed objects handed down from God, whose frontiers are permanent. On the contrary, nation-states come and go. In international law terms, the era of the nation-states is taken to begin in 1648. Before that time, international law (such as it was) gave less prominence to nation-states and there was a tendency for people to be ruled from (in Europe) one central place, such as Rome. Nation-states have, then, only been with us for about 330 years. They have served a purpose but one which is coming to an end.

Second, the nation-state as an institution is threatened by a series of forces, whose full significance is not recognized by governments and most of their citizens. Multinational corporations are the most obvious form of recent innovation which is threatening the nation-state, if not making it redundant. Few (if any) governments can withstand pressures from these corporations; they either cave in, or, in Washington's case, be so closely allied with them that it is difficult to ascertain the precise division of responsibilities. The 10 largest corporations produce a wealth greater than the GNP of 80 of the world's nations and on present trends will control 41 per cent of world production (excluding communist nations) by 1988 (14). Meanwhile, the growth of international crises concerning the earth itself, such as pollution, food and energy, has forced nations to surrender some of their political independence to the United Nations as a way of working collectively to solve common problems. Meanwhile individuals no longer (especially in western countries) look to much to their governments to settle problems and they pay more attention to non-governmental organizations, such as human rights organizations like Amnesty International (15). These organizations, though lacking money and armed forces, can cause embarrassment for governments and force them to introduce policies which they do not like, such as Amnesty's campaign for the release of Indonesian political prisoners. Within nation-states (as we see in Indonesia) there are peoples who feel that they can get along better either with a large degree of autonomy or complete separation. Almost every nation has problems with minority groups (16). Additionally, given the haphazard method of drawing colonial boundaries, people within one nation often feel closer to people in another, such as the Melanesians in West Irian and Papua New Guinea. Independence since 1945 from imperial powers is sometimes only a transition phase during which people ready themselves for yet another national identity.

It may well be that the future nation-states will be smaller than the present variety, with more emphasis on cultural ties. This also conforms to the "small is beautiful" movement, with more simple methods of technology and life styles. It would seem that the future of the ramshackle Indonesian nation-state is, then, still further threatened. But this applies to most nation-states;

in Britain, for instance, Welsh and Scottish nationalists are seeking greater autonomy if not independence from London. We are heading back to a pre-1648 situation, with some form of United Nations providing the central guidance system and people living in small communities. Alternatively, if we are unlucky, multinational corporations will be providing the central guidance system.

The End of the Era of "National Liberation Movements".

National liberation movements are not new. Moses was one of the first such leaders when he led the Hebrews out of Egypt about 3,500 years ago. The phrase "self-determination" was popularized by the U.S. Government (in the days when it took a more radical approach towards ending European overseas empires) during World War I. Most liberation movements, however, have flourished in the last 40 years.

Although it is common for conservative critics of the United Nations to accuse it of having confused standards on national liberation, the UN is in fact strict on what it recognizes as liberation movements. Liberation movements exist only in areas which are colonies (like Zimbabwe) or ruled by alien and foreign people (like Israeli-occupied territory). Second, people in these areas get only one go at national liberation. If, having become independent, they do not like their new rulers, it is too bad. They will not be recognized for a second time. The UN did not recognize, for example, the breakaway parts of Nigeria during the civil war. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam **got** no recognition; the Viet Minh was the Vietnamese liberation movement (which won independence from the French). I doubt if FRETILIN will ever get liberation movement status. It is most unlikely that the West Irian movement will get it.

The UN's recognition policy is derived from the concerns of almost all its member-nations about their own potential "liberation movements". To allow liberation movements to be recognized within independent nations (except for Israel and South Africa) will create precedents for themselves. As far as the UN is concerned we are coming to the end of the era of "national liberation movements".

However, I have commented upon earlier that nation-states are not fixed parts of the international scene. Many are being torn apart by people wishing to have more power in running their own affairs. I have suggested that the phrase "social liberation movements" be coined and applied to movements within independent nations, which are seeking not merely independence but social justice (17). FRETILIN and the Free Papua Movement are two good illustrations of this.

The Significance of Human Rights in International Relations.

Human rights are here to stay. The spread of the transistor radio, for example, has enabled the most isolated person to learn the fact that he or she has basic rights which are to be protected. Even a society like China's, which has been one of the world's most isolated, is now seeing wall posters by people wanting to have respect for human rights. This interest in human rights has been matched by an elaborate network of human rights protection legal machinery (18).

However, the invasion of East Timor has shown how the political significance of human rights in international rights may not always equal the machinery which exists to protect them. The United States Government suspended some of its military aid to the Indonesian

Government at the time of the invasion but this lasted only six months. The Americans have since been helping Indonesia. This is despite the fact that the U.S. is ruled by a person who claims to have more regard for the protection of human rights than his immediate predecessors. The same could be said about the Whitlam Government, which spoke harshly about white racism in southern Africa but did nothing to stop the Indonesian invasion. It would seem that the further away the human rights violation and the less strategic the situation, the more inclined is a government to speak in favour of human rights. China and the Soviet Union, though they have criticized the Indonesian invasion, have been restrained in their support for FRETILIN. It would seem that their individual concerns to maintain detente with the United States overshadows their concern to help FRETILIN, let alone the Free Papua Movement.


The lesson of East Timor is that each government acts in what it perceives to be its own interests and only incidentally worries about the intrinsic merits of the victims of human rights violations. Our approach, then, should be to show why the protection of human rights is in the interests of each government. I have argued this in Protecting Human Rights and need not go over the points again. Suffice it to say, I am confident that it is possible to increase considerably the significance of human rights in international relations.

East Timor lives. It lives in the sense that the people in East Timor are still not defeated and look likely to win eventually, though opinions vary over just how long this will take. It also lives in the implications which it has not only for the future of Indonesia as a nation-state but also in the lessons and implications it provides for the wider context. I trust that this paper will have initiated some thoughts about the wider context.

NOTES

- (1) Nonie Sharp The Rule of the Sword: the story of West Irian, Kibble, Victoria, 1977.
- (2) The Wallace Line was drawn by the naturalist after whom it is called to separate the fauna of Asia from that of Australasia. The accuracy (though not the intention) has been questioned: Donald W. Fryer and James C. Jackson Indonesia, Benn, London, 1977, p.12.
- (3) "Aru: first hand report-history" Retrieval: newsletter of current events (Melbourne), January 1975, pp 19-28.
- (4) The original state of Pakistan, which was divided by the Indian land mass, consisted of two parts which the British assumed would stick together as a nation-state since they both had Islam as a religion (even though they differed in many other respects). Religion failed to keep the country together and eastern Pakistan is now the Bangladesh nation-state. In Indonesia's case, religion may not so much be a glue as a divisive force since some Moslems clearly differ with the Government over the value of secular western habits; the installation of an extremist Iranian Government may encourage the Indonesian Islamic purists to seek greater respect for Islam. It is notable that the ruling elite is influenced less by Islam than by secular western habits and traditional Javanse beliefs.

- (5) Jon Tinker "Jakarta: second Calcutta?" People (London), Vol I, No.4, 1974, pp 12-15.
- (6) Keith D. Suter "International Law and East Timor" Dyason House Papers (Melbourne), December 1978.
- (7) For a study of Jakarta's attempted influence, see: Robin Hanbury-Tenison A Pattern of Peoples: a journey among the tribes in Indonesia's outer islands, Angus & Robertson, London, 1974.
- (8) International Institute for Strategic Studies The Military Balance 1978-1979, London, 1978, p.89.
- (9) Amnesty International Report on Indonesia, London, 1977.
- (10) For example: Rex Mortimer (editor) Showcase State: the illusion of Indonesia's 'accelerated modernization', Angus & Robertson, London, 1973.
- (11) Seth Lipsky and Raphael Pura "Indonesia: testing time for the 'New Order'" Foreign Affairs (New York), 1978, pp 186-202.
- (12) Ben Anderson "Last days of Indonesia's Suharto?" Southeast Asia Chronicle (Berkeley), July 1978, p.3.
- (13) Jose Ramos Horta at UN Decolonization Committee, September 8, 1976, UN Document: A/AC. 109/PV. 1052, p.18.
- (14) Jan Tinbergen et al Reshaping the International Order, Hutchinson, London, 1977, p. 274.
- (15) Keith D. Suter The International Status of Human Rights Non-Governmental Organizations, International Law Association/Butterworths, Sydney, 1978.
- (16) The Minority Rights Group (36 Craven Street, London, WC 1), is the most important research group working on this subject.
- (17) Keith D. Suter "National Liberation Movements" New Zealand Monthly, May 1977, pp 18-21.
- (18) Keith D. Suter Protecting Human Rights, United Nations Association, Sydney, 1978.



"The West Irian border? First left past the bomb blast."

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AUSTRALIAN MILITARY AID TO INDONESIA - by George Preston (Secretary, AETA Melbourne).

In this presentation Australian Military Aid to Indonesia is not treated separately from military aid to the rest of ASEAN nor is it considered out of the context of economic and political developments in the region. It is only in relation to regional and global developments that recent Australian governments' attitudes to Indonesia - and the consequent military relationship - can be understood.

Australian Military Aid - How much, who gets it, why?

Australian military aid in 1977-78 amounted to A\$25.9 million - approximately 1% of Defence expenditure. It was distributed as shown in the following table:

Table 1. Distribution of Australian Military Aid

Country	Military Aid \$A '000 (est)	Percentage of total
Indonesia	7, 200	27.8%
Malaysia	4, 000	15.4%
Philippines	80	0.3%
Singapore	800	3.1%
Thailand	60	0.2%
ASEAN total	12, 140	46.8%
Papua N.G.	13, 225	51.0%
Tonga	480	1.9%
Fiji	20	0.1%
Other	60	0.2%
Total	25, 925	100.0%

Australia has military assistance programmes with every non-communist country in South-East Asia (except Burma). The governments of these countries are staunchly anti-communist and are actively encouraging foreign investment through (among other things) repressive anti-labour measures. The unequal distribution of income, corruption, lack of democracy, and the ruthless clamping down on dissent, as well as agricultural policies which result in masses of peasants being forced off their land, have created considerable internal opposition. Most of the region's regimes are fighting national liberation movements or secessionist movements and hold large numbers of political prisoners.

Australian military aid is ostensibly to assist these countries develop their external defence capabilities. This is true for a proportion of the aid. However, the ASEAN regimes are dependent on their armed forces for the maintenance of power. Australian aid contributes to the military forces which enable these repressive regimes to remain in power particularly through officer training programmes - Indonesian officers have even been trained in interrogation techniques (ABC Four Corners 1974) - provision of communications equipment, mapping projects, and the provision of equipment which is most likely to be useful in combatting internal rather than external threats such as Nomad aircraft, helicopters, and Police patrol boats.

** The contents of this presentation are predominantly the result of research carried out by Richard Tanter.

Australian military assistance should not be viewed in isolation. It must be considered in the context of US involvement in the region and of the military programmes of ASEAN nations - particularly the purchases of substantial quantities of sophisticated equipment from Western capitalist powers. When seen in this light Australian aid is clearly part of an attempt to keep pro-Western, anti-communist regimes in power (regardless of their internal policies) so that the region will remain accessible as an investment outlet, market, and source of raw materials (e.g. oil) for Western and Japanese capitalism.

US Military Aid.

As can be seen from Table 2 Australian aid has been limited in its scope. This is obviously a product of the nature of the Australian armed forces and of Australian 'defence industries' which are readily adaptable to the provision of training, and of communications equipment, Nomad aircraft, and patrol boats, etc.

Table 2.

Australian Defence Co-operation Expenditure 1977-78 (Est.): Indonesia, Malaysia & Singapore.

	<u>Indonesia</u>	<u>Malaysia</u>	<u>Singapore</u>
<u>General</u>			
Australian advisers on loan	-	250,000	350,000
Training in Australia	150,000	1,500,000	200,000
Combined exercises	200,000	150,000	150,000
Miscellaneous Equipment	50,000	50,000	50,000
Sub-Total	\$ 400,000	1,950,000	750,000
<u>Special Projects</u>			
Maritime Patrol			
-Nomad Aircraft	2,000,000		
-16 metre craft	600,000		
-'Attack' patrol boats	100,000		
-RAN Advisory team	100,000		
Survey and Mapping	1,700,000		
Sabre Aircraft	300,000		
Field Communications	700,000		
Research & Development	200,000		
English Language project	100,000		
Sioux Helicopters	1,000,000		
Armed Forces Manufacturing Workshop		1,300,000	
Parachute & Diving School		400,000	
Defence Research Centre		200,000	
Royal Malaysian Police			
Patrol Boats		150,000	
Cataloguing Project			50,000
Special Projects Total	\$ 6,800,000	2,050,000	50,000
Total	\$ 7,200,000	4,000,000	800,000

More extensive aid has been provided by the United States. The aid of Australia and the US has been complementary both in distribution (with the US continuing its historical connections with the

Philippines and Thailand and Australia with Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia) and nature (with the US providing the heavier and more sophisticated equipment).

Indonesia is the key element in US policy in South-East Asia. It is the country on which most effort has been spent in order to make it into "the strategic area's unaggressive, but stern monitor" since, in the view of the Pentagon, "Indonesia is the only nation in that part of the world with the resources, the population, and the determination to prevent itself and its continental neighbours from becoming Russian or Chinese satellites". (Sea Power, Feb.1973, p.20).

US military co-operation began soon after the 1965 coup. At first US grants under the Military Assistance Program remained around \$5 million per year. Once it became clear that the US would not win in Vietnam a new approach was adopted to the protection of US strategic and economic interests in South-East Asia. Under the new policy - which became known as the Nixon doctrine - indigenous armies were to replace US forces in most ground combat roles while American ships and aircraft were to continue to dominate the area's waterways and air spaces. In order to strengthen local forces for their enlarged responsibilities Nixon ordered a sharp increase in military aid and technical assistance to favoured Third World regimes. As can be seen from Table 3 the increase in military aid to Indonesia was dramatic - from \$6.3 million in 1970 to \$33.3 million in 1971 and continued at around \$25 million per year until around 1975.

Table 3.

US MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS SALES TO INDONESIA, FISCAL YEARS
1967 - 75^a

(dollars in millions)

Program	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75 ^b	Total '67-'75
Military Asstce Program grants	2.5	4.6	4.9	5.4	16.1	18.0	18.6	14.0	22.7	106.8
Deliveries of Excess US weapons	-	0.1	0.2	0.9	0.7	3.5	0.5	0.7	6.2	12.8
Deliveries of Ex- US Navy warships	-	-	-	-	16.5	3.6	-	-	-	20.1
Foreign Military Sales Credits	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.5	-	3.5
Total Military Assistance -	2.5	4.7	5.1	6.3	33.3	25.1	19.1	18.2	28.9	143.2
Foreign Military Sales orders ^c	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	37.2	37.4

a -Source (unless otherwise noted): US Agency for International Development, US Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1945-June 30, 1974 (Washington, D.C.: 1975), p.71.

b -1975 data from: US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Assistance Authorisations, Fiscal Year 1975, Hearings, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 1974, p.7.

c -Source: US Department of Defence data sheets, 1974 and 1975.

(from "Indonesia and the Nixon Doctrine", Michael T. Klare, Ten Years Military Terror in Indonesia Ed. by Malcolm Caldwell, Spokesman Books, 1975).

In 1975, as a result of domestic pressure and the onset of economic recession in the US, military supplies to Indonesia and elsewhere began to be switched from direct grants under the Military Assistance Program to other programs particularly the Foreign Military Sales program. Recently it has been announced that the Military Assistance Program will cease (except for training) and so all arms will be transferred through other programs from now on.

The American aid program has emphasised weapons and training for counterinsurgency and internal security. Included have been M-16 rifles and other infantry arms, F-51D "Mustang" counter-insurgency attack planes, Sikorsky S-55 helicopters, and spare parts to keep Indonesian B-25 and B-26 medium bombers and C-47 and C-130 transports flying. All these have obvious counter-insurgency applications as have Indonesia's purchases of Bronco OV-10F light strike aircraft and Bell 205 helicopters in 1977.

ASEAN Arms Expansion

Despite the evident needs of the people of the region for food, education, health facilities, and employment ASEAN governments have engaged in rapid arms build-up.

ASEAN countries as a whole spent in 1977 around US\$2000 million (in 1973 US dollars) on their armed forces. i.e. about the same as Australia.

Around 22% of the total of the government budgets was devoted to the military - c.f. Australia 12.8%. Indonesia's 30% was the largest of the five nations in ASEAN but even so is an underestimate since much of the military's funds come from enterprises run by the forces.

Military expenditure has increased by a fairly typical Third World figure of 340% over the last twenty years.

The ASEAN countries have obtained new major weapons from industrialized countries in recent years and are continuing to do so. Furthermore Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines are engaging in domestic production of major weapons.

The 1978 SIPRI Yearbook lists the following major weapons imported or ordered by Indonesia in 1977:

- 6 Nomad GAF Searchmaster cargo/reconnaissance aircraft (AUSTRALIA)
- 6 16m De Havilland Patrol Boats (AUSTRALIA)
- .. Aerospatiale Exocet Ship-to-Ship missiles (FRANCE)
- * 6 Aerospatiale SA-330 Puma medium helicopters (FRANCE)
- * 50 MBB Bo-105 helicopters (FR GERMANY)
- 12 VFW/Fokker military transport aircraft (FR GERMANY)
- 2 Howaldtswerke Type 209 Submarines (FR GERMANY)
- 4 Korea Tacoma fast attack patrol boats (SOUTH KOREA)
- 3 Fijenoord Wilton fast patrol boats (NETHERLANDS)
- * 28 Casa C-212 Utility Transport aircraft (SPAIN)
- 16 Beech T-34 C-1 Turbo Trainer, armed trainer aircraft (USA)
- 16 Bell 205 Helicopters (USA)
- 12 Northrop F-5E Tiger II fighter/ground attack aircraft (USA)
- * 30 Nurtanio LT 200 Trainer aircraft
- 16 Rockwell OV-10F Bronco light strike aircraft (USA).

(* indicates that the aircraft or helicopter is now being produced at the PT Nurtanio factory in Bandung).

As can be seen from the above list Indonesia has embarked on a substantial program of domestic production (under licence) of major weapons from industrialised countries.

The general thrust of arms expansion is similar in other ASEAN countries though the details and magnitudes vary.

Details of Australian Military Aid.

It is in the context of substantial US military aid and ASEAN arms expansion as outlined above that the details of Australian aid should be examined.

It should also be considered that full details are not available because of factors such as the following:

- (a) difficulties in obtaining reliable information
 - . on aggregate spending - different government departments give different figures for the same time periods
 - . on individual projects - very little information can be obtained
 - . on military-industrial production and exports - once again, very little information available
- (b) not all military aid is reported as such - many civil aid projects have military implications
- (c) spending on intelligence is not monitored by Parliament and consequently there is little information available on the level of spending or on the breakdown of services
- (d) the valuation of military equipment (particularly secondhand) is not satisfactory
- (e) there is evidence that some military activities are funded by unidentified sources - the Defence Report of 1973 reported to Parliament on an extensive program of military aid to Malaysia but concluded that "some of the activities are being funded from the allocation for defence aid" implying that some (most?) of the funding came from other sources.

A brief summary of the Australian military aid projects with Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore follows:

INDONESIA.

Maritime Patrol Project. The largest single item of Australian military aid to Indonesia is the long-running Maritime Patrol project. It involves Nomad aircraft, De Havilland patrol boats and an RAN advisory team. The Indonesian version of the Nomad, known as the Searchmaster, costs around \$300,000. It is fitted for surveillance and maritime patrol work. Refurbished Australian attack class patrol boats (146 ton displacement) and new 16 metre De Havilland Carpentaria patrol boats make up the other part of the Maritime Patrol project. Intended primarily for use against smugglers, the patrol boats are given without armaments. However, they can be readily armed. It is important to note here that Indonesia has ordered larger patrol boats from South Korean shipyards. These are American-designed 'Tacoma' class boats, over 200 feet long, which will be armed with French Exocet ship to ship missiles.

This equipment is directly relevant to Indonesia's attempt to conquer East Timor. The information and supply blockade around East Timor is a critical part of the Indonesian strategy. The Maritime Patrol project is contributing to it considerably.

Surveying and Mapping. Australia's surveying and mapping aid, which began with projects in Kalimantan and Sumatra in 1971, has culminated in the West Irian Topographical Survey, for which \$1.7 million was set aside in 1977-8.

This survey involved up to 140 RAAF and Army personnel in a three year project to map and accurately survey remote parts of West Irian. Equipment included Canberra reconnaissance and Caribou aircraft. Iroquois helicopters and sophisticated surveying and photographic equipment.

The ostensible aim was 'to contribute to Indonesian planning for national development'. Other purposes, however, are apparent. Australia's military interest is involved - the information from the survey would be invaluable in the event of conflict between Papua-New Guinea and Indonesia, a possibility considered in defence scenarios. Australian economic interests are also involved, as the survey will also yield information relevant to minerals exploration.

More immediate, though, is the usefulness of the mapping to the Indonesian government's repressive activities in West Irian. Free Papuans have claimed the maps are already being used to bomb villages thereby attacking civilians and food supplies. Recent evidence shows that Indonesian airforce planes are indeed bombing villages in areas where Australian personnel have worked.

Military Training. Since 1971, at least 892 Indonesians have been trained in Australian institutions. In 1977-78, at least 50 were to enter a range of courses at a cost of \$150,000. Courses range from short technical matters to full length officer training courses at Duntroon. Some courses are particularly suited to Indonesian needs, eg. training in flying and maintaining the Sabre aircraft.

Training is regarded as particularly important because it allows Australian military and civil officials to develop personal relationships with future Indonesian military leaders.

Of particular concern is the fact that Indonesia has given no assurance that Australian-trained servicemen will not be used in the war in East Timor or in incursions into Papua New Guinea territory. Further, there is evidence that Indonesians have been trained in hostile interrogation techniques. East Timorese refugees in Portugal report that Indonesian officers conducted interrogations with systematic torture.

Field Communications. Australian aid in field communications is a long-running project involving the supply of radio transceivers and field repair facilities for communication and for military vehicles. All of these have obvious applications to aggressive wars such as that in East Timor.

Aircraft. The 16 Avon Sabre fighter aircraft (ex-RAAF) supplied by Australia in 1973 (together with spare parts, training, and advisory team) have proved unexpectedly costly and have not seemed useful to Indonesia. Other transfers of equipment could be more clearly part of a military purpose. Little is known about the transfer worth \$1 million, of Sioux helicopters to Indonesia but the purchase by Indonesia of the American Bell-USA helicopters and the commencement of production under licence of Messerschmit-Boehm-Boelkow and Aero-spatiale helicopters suggests that the use made of the transfer should be closely examined. This is particularly so since the wars in East Timor and West Irian have come to rely more on Indonesian military technology including helicopters and aircraft.

Research and Development. There is little reliable information concerning the programme of co-operation between Indonesian and

Australian military research and development sections. Indonesia and Singapore both plan to use Australian expertise from the Weapons Research Establishment to assist with missile development. More information is needed on this co-operation particularly in the light of Indonesian purchase of Aerospatiale missiles for its navy and missile-carrying aircraft from Northrop and British Aerospace.

Joint Exercises. Similarly, little publicity is given to joint naval and air exercises. At least five of these have been held since 1972. Last year a large joint exercise codenamed Southern Cross II was held in the Coral Sea.

MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE.

Australian involvement in Malaysia and Singapore has been largely in the form of actual military presence. This presence is part of an overall strategic policy, and has largely grown out of past involvement, as well as shifts in overall U.S.-centred strategy.

The involvement grew under a succession of diplomatic and military agreements, beginning with the post-WWII ANZAM (Australian New Zealand and Malayan Area) planning between Britain, Australia and New Zealand. In 1950, the Menzies government dispatched two RAAF bomber and transport squadrons to assist Britain in the early stages of the Malayan Emergency. Five years later, Australia contributed to the establishment of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve by committing over 3,000 troops, two squadrons of fighters and bombers, and warships in Malaya and Singapore. Australian troops were again involved in Malaysia during the Confrontation episode.

Formal military assistance to Malaysia began in 1963-64 and increased with the ending of Confrontation and the British withdrawals of the late 1960's.

In 1971 the ANZUK force (Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain) was created. This force, for which Australia provided most of the troops and the senior command, constituted the greatest number of Australian forces in the area since WWII.

The ANZUK force was wound up in 1974, but Australia is still involved in work begun by it. A most important part of this was the creation of the joint integrated Air Defence System (IADS) between Malaysia and Singapore. Australia was a moving force behind this project, which involves weapons such as Australian Mirages, as well as sophisticated electronic tracking systems and communications. Australia continues to take part in joint exercises of the system.

Australia today maintains the largest foreign bases on the Asian mainland, with its two air bases at Butterworth in Malaysia and Tengah in Singapore, which employs two and a half of Australia's three squadrons of Mirage fighters. These forces, maintained well after Malaysian and Singapore Air Forces have become fully operational with comparable aircraft are supposedly present for the purposes of defence against external threat and for training related to that. There is no foreseeable external threat to either country.

Both Malaysia and Singapore conduct joint exercises with Australia, and Australia maintains a continual naval presence in Singapore. Both countries have sent contingents of troops to exercise in Australia in recent years.

Both Malaysia and Singapore receive roughly half their military aid from Australia in the form of training in Australia or of Australian personnel on loan. Malaysia has received Australian assistance for its police force - that is, for internal not external security. All Australian training courses and programmes should be scrutinized to see if they are being used for police purposes. Malaysia has recently begun to receive large amounts of U.S. military aid, mainly directed at its counter-insurgency efforts. Clearly, aid a country receives for police and counter-insurgency work increases its capacity for repression.

Conclusion.

The main purpose behind Australian military aid to ASEAN countries is to help ensure that these countries are integrated more fully into the world capitalist economy. The aid complements the aid of the United States and the expanding arms programmes of the ASEAN nations themselves in maintaining internal security in spite of the repression which is necessary to attract foreign investment.

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STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN EAST TIMOR - Bill Tulley (Australian National Library).

At the heart of the East Timor struggle is the domination of South-East Asia by U.S. imperialism. Since the defeat of the U.S. by the people of Indochina in 1975 and the elevation of Indonesia to the position of prime bulwark against regional incursions by the U.S.S.R., events in this region have enormous strategic implications. To be aware of these issues is crucial if progressive Australians are to link their own fight for independence with the more advanced liberation movement of the Maubere people.

The military, economic, and cultural subordination of Australia to U.S. imperialism is devastatingly obvious, but the exploitation of Indonesia must also be clearly kept in mind. The U.S. both bankrolls and arms the Suharto clique, which it installed with CIA assistance in 1965/66. It has the second largest investment in the country (\$US 1 billion in 1974), military sales of \$US44M in 1977/78 and enormous influence through 'international' consortiums, financial institutions and programs. Compared to other countries it has huge leverage, used sometimes openly, sometimes covertly. Japan, with a larger total investment, cannot wield comparable power because of its dependence on energy and mineral supplies and the U.S. defence umbrella. Australia with \$7.2 M defence assistance in 1977/78 and \$173 M investments not only has far less political and economic power but what it does have is often totally dependent on the U.S.

Suharto may publicly rebuke Australia for criticisms of his Timor genocide but he seldom takes the U.S. to task - he needs U.S. money and guns and the U.S. needs him. Consultations are carried out at the highest level. In December 1975 Kissinger and Ford approved the Timor invasion plan; in May 1978 Vice President Mondale gave a further seal of approval. Murdani, the Indonesian architect of the Timor invasion, shopped for arms in the U.S. before operation Komodo that 90% of the arms used in that venture were American. More recently U.S. napalm has been used to defoliate crops, and mercenary advisers to bomb villages. Such things demand a wider explanation than either bloodymindedness or the profitability of genocide.

In my view the passage of U.S. nuclear submarines between the West Coast and Guam through the Indonesian archipelago does much to explain U.S. actions on East Timor. It also illustrates how subserviant Australia's foreign policy is to the U.S.

In short the strategic position of Indonesia in the U.S. imperium forces both Carter and Suharto to suppress the East Timorese liberation struggle.

In August 1976, Age journalist Michael Richardson drew attention to the Ombai Wetar straits north of East Timor by citing the findings of strategic defence analysts Osgood and McGuire that the depth and width of the straits made submarines less vulnerable to detection there than in Lombok or Malacca while their distance from Russia was still satisfactory for nuclear targeting. Richardson linked these facts with recent State Department pressure on Prime Minister

Fraser to seek an understanding on Australian-Indonesian differences over East Timor. The conclusion drawn was that publicising of the Ombai Wetar passage either by Indonesia in a fit of righteous anger at the 'secret' use of territorial water by foreign warships or the victory of Fretilin and the subsequent demand (embodied in the 'non alignment' clause of its program) that foreign interference in its territory cease, would seriously inconvenience U.S. defence interests.

It is my guess (for which there is as yet only circumstantial evidence) that the U.S. and Indonesia reached a secret agreement where the Americans exchanged diplomatic, military and possibly economic support of the 'incorporation' of East Timor into Suharto's state for an open hand to use the Straits for submarine passage.

Whether U.S. submarines pass through Ombai Wetar or not, they certainly navigate other straits of the Indonesian archipelago and in so doing flagrantly breach the Law of the Sea which demands the surfacing of hostile vessels or prior notification of underwater passage.

The United States has not recognised this 'archipelagic principle'. McGiffert of the Defence Department explained why in mid 1977 when he said that prior notification would 'reduce our ability to protect the security of the United States and its allies' and recommended secrecy. In comparison the U.S.S.R. which has obvious reasons for inconveniencing U.S. nuclear submarines in the region and securing its own growing interest has openly supported Indonesia's archipelagic principle.

Whatever the complexities of the issue it is obvious that such nuclear submarines as Poseidon are guided through Indonesian waters by the North West Cape base on Australian soil, thereby placing this country in the firing line in any future nuclear war between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. superpowers. If Ombai Wetar assists U.S. imperialism then the East Timorese struggle is a direct threat to it. It could therefore be argued that Fretilin is fighting for our own independence as well as their own. The necessity for a bolder struggle on a more united front by patriotic Australians to expel foreign bases and economic exploiters is as evident as the common interests of East Timor and Australia. As the Maubere people fight and die for their freedom and construct a more just society Australians must have solidarity with their struggle and work with them to forge a better world, free from superpower domination.

Discussion

Other issues than those spoken to in the paper were brought up, though some disagreement with the extent of the subordination of Indonesian foreign policy to the U.S. was expressed and a brief discussion held on the relative appropriateness of 'imperialism', 'sub-imperialism' or 'colonialism' to describe Australian overseas exploitation.

The morale of the Indonesian army and its fighting capacity in Timor and West Papua New Guinea was debated. While lower rank dissatisfaction was agreed to exist, the experience (albeit largely unsuccessful) of fighting guerilla wars should not be underestimated as a factor in strengthening a fighting force too glibly seen in the Australian media as incompetent.

Denis Freney made a scenario of a more moderate regime in Jakarta willing to grant Australia more economic concessions in East Timor and asked for opinions on possible responses. Those at the workshop affirmed the necessity to continue full support for Fretilin's opposition to such a neo-colonialist solution as under the more exploitative one at present existing and Bill Tully thought any neo-colonialist solution unlikely without U.S. approval as long as Australia remained a client state of U.S. imperialism.

Other topics touched on included the role of China, Whitlam's foreign policy and the threat to Papua New Guinea posed by Indonesia.

theme: ASIAN BACKGROUND.



MOVEMENTS IN ASIA SINCE VIETNAM - Bruce McFarlane (Politics
Dept., Adelaide University)
(precis)

State of the Movements.

1. The withdrawal of US land forces from the Asian mainland raised the question: "Who is to do the fighting for the multi-nationals?"
2. The answer has largely been found in the increased military and security offensives against national liberation and communist forces in the Philippines, Thailand and Malaya.
3. Pressure has also been put on Vietnam by threats, cajolery offers and withdrawal of aid.
4. China has increasingly toned down support for the Maoist insurgency forces in Thailand. It also, according to Sihanouk came to an agreement with Thai officials to supply Pol Pot guerillas and actual Chinese guerillas in Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand (NY Times 9/2/78). There is an in-depth report on the Thai guerilla movement in the London Observer 24/12/78.
5. In the Philippines, the old "CP", which is not Maoist is functioning above ground for the first time in many years, and has rural as well as factory bases. The pro-China CP has student and rural bases but has been seriously weakened in the last three years by Marcos' rapprochement with China and the defection of key leaders who now work as Marcos aides.

The Resources Angle: Geopolitical Contradictions.

1. To win independence, the patriotic, anti-multinational forces need land and resources. Physiocratic thinking becomes part of strategic thinking.
2. To get a good example of the way this needs to be thought through, one should study Dr. Malcolm Caldwell's "The Wealth of Some Nations" (Zed Press) and his earlier "Oil Imperialism in S.E. Asia" (Spokesman pamphlet). He shows that ecology is closely linked with the problem of "overdevelopment" in the west on the one hand, and the anti-imperialist struggle on the other. If third world nations fail to protect their resource base, and allow world food cereals, oil and minerals to be gobbled up by the U.S. production machine, then they can never achieve a rising of living standards for their peoples.
3. In my view, world capitalism will be prepared to go to war over this question. The defeat of the multinationals in the field would free resources for the people of the third world after independence to develop. Hence, an anti-imperialist struggle to head off such a war (which would quickly turn into ecocide and a race war) is a prime political strategy of the western left, in supporting Asian revolutionaries.

The first thing we must do in this workshop is refuse to discuss this topic on the basis of "since 1975". Too many discussions take place on this basis, drawing the curtain on the major Indo-China wars and their consequences, describing present difficulties and harsh policies and saying "this is communism". No mention is made of the US bombing, the disruption of village life and the way in which people became refugees in their own country. The truth of the matter is that recent policies are framed within limited options determined by what happened before 1975.

During this period the nature of imperialism was exposed in obvious ways. The young today are ignorant of this history, and as they encounter the media's dark picture of atrocities in Kampuchea and Vietnamese "aggression" they are mentally cut off from the older people who opposed the war. In the community at large, in spite of abundant literature and documentation to the contrary, many people still believe that US policies were justified. For them, recent events are confirmation. For insight into public attitudes it is worth reading Gloria Emerson's Winners and Losers. Emerson was a war correspondent. Recently she travelled through the United States interviewing people of all walks of life. Overwhelmingly these people held distorted views of the IndoChina war. Not so long ago the English Guardian published an article which stated that the North Vietnamese were about to invade Kampuchea in the same way as they invaded South Vietnam!¹ For the most part the media has buried the war. It was these distortions which prompted Malcolm Caldwell, Noam Chomsky, and Pierre Rousset to draw the attention of readers through correspondence columns and elsewhere to dishonest editorial policies and practice in the Times, Christian Science Monitor and the French press.²

A further disquieting trend is the way in which the left is becoming factionalised as groups identify with the various protagonists in the conflict, splitting over issues in foreign countries which are still quite imprecise because of limits to accurate information. This is happening at a time when maximum solidarity is needed in the face of heightened attacks on livelihood and the physical environment, on access to information and the right to speak and organise, and on all forms of creative thought and expression.

There is increasing risk of major war in Asia. Central to this fact: by denying aid to Vietnam, the United States has driven the Vietnamese government to increasing dependence on the Soviet Union and exacerbated conflict with China. Vietnam since 1975 has given many indications that it wanted to avoid this dependence, but from the West there was little response.

Turning now to relations between Kampuchea and Vietnam. Kampuchean Communist Party has a long history but for the most part as a small group. Sihanouk led the nationalist movement. As a result of the Geneva Agreements 1954 the Khmer Rouge secured neither territory nor a political role. One group remained in Kampuchea, the other, numbering about 5,000, settled in Hanoi. Recently Pol Pot has spoken of resentment over this settlement and the way in which later events reinforced his distrust of the Vietnamese.³ In the late sixties the Khmer Rouge was constantly hunted down by the Phnom Penh government at a time when the Vietnamese communists were dependent on good relations with Sihanouk to safeguard their supply lines to the south. On the signing of the peace treaty in 1973 Kissinger told the Vietnamese they must urge the Khmer Rouge to give up fighting and negotiate with Lon Nol at a time when they had everything to gain by fighting on. William Shawcross, who has made a close study of this period, states that Kissinger warned that Article 21 aid was conditional on this. Whether or not Vietnam limited arms supplies after this is not clear but Shawcross believes that

twice the Khmer Rouge came close to taking Phnom Penh and were checked by limited firepower⁴. After the treaty was signed B52's pounded the countryside of Kampuchea for a period of eight months - it filled us with a great anger, the communists have said⁵. It is on record that Chou en lai remarked to Kissinger "the longer this war continues the harsher will be the peace"⁶.

After victory April 1975, the Khmer Rouge led the people out of the cities, and many people died - some of hunger, malnutrition; some were executed. Many became sick with malaria, as bomb craters filled with water and mosquitoes multiplied. Pol Pot has stated that the main reason for this exodus was not the problem of food supply or the desire to found a new society based upon the soil but determination to break up spy organisations, to weaken the revolution's enemies⁷. Throughout the entire campaign against Lon Nol, 1970-75, there had been sharp struggles within the army leadership, between local party members, those formerly in exile and supporters of Sihanouk. These divisions, combined with Pol Pot's distrust of the Vietnamese, are critically related to the present conflict. Another relevant factor is the striking differences between the programmes and policies of the Kampuchean and Vietnamese governments, which have been analysed by Stephen Heder and others, and which we should examine more closely in our discussion.

In spite of all these factors, after some initial border clashes in 1975 there were signs in 1976 that both sides were prepared to adopt a conciliatory attitude. Although border negotiations were suspended in May 1976 no border clashes occurred during the rest of that year. When border clashes began and got worse the reason lies not in border issues but in Khmer politics.



.Civilian houses near Chau Doc town in An Giang province, burned down by Kampuchean troops in January 1978.
(from TRIBUNE)

It seems that a plot for a coup was uncovered in February 1977, and during March and April four province chiefs, a number of regional commanders and over 500 village chiefs were executed. Various officials had been protesting that the peasants were overworked, and rations too low.¹⁰ This opposition was associated by Pol Pot with the pro Hanoi faction of the Kampuchean Communist Party and with Vietnamese subversion.¹¹ Kampuchean raids on Vietnamese villages began in April 1977. Nayan Chanda reported in the Far Eastern Economic Review August 19th 1977 that the Vietnamese government was still hopeful of resolving border problems through negotiation. However in that month General Giap visited the border and in September about 10,000 Vietnamese troops were fighting in the border districts apparently as pressure to induce negotiation. In the same month Kampuchea mounted a major offensive, and Pol Pot visited Peking, received a warm welcome, and was given an assurance of continued military aid. In December Kampuchea broke off diplomatic relations with Vietnam.

Nayan Chanda, of the Review, believes that when General Giap visited Moscow in March 1978 he was advised to undertake full scale military intervention in Kampuchea, and that this advice was rejected.¹² When Chanda visited the Vietnamese border districts in April 1978 he saw thousands of hectares of abandoned rice fields, deserted villages and mutilated corpses. Ha Tien, population 30,000, was deserted. Damage was very great in Chau Doc and Tay Ninh. He spoke to refugees who said they were willing to fight with Vietnamese armies against Pol Pot.¹⁴ By then there were more than one million displaced persons in Vietnam consisting of 150,000 Khmer refugees, 170,000 Vietnamese formerly resident in Kampuchea and 750,000 Vietnamese in flight from the border districts.¹⁵ Families newly settled in new economic zones were back in Ho Chi Minh City sleeping on the pavements, and soldiers working on the land were now engaged in combat. In June there was another major uprising against the Pol Pot Government,¹⁶ and in December a group led by Heng Samrin set up the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation. Their programme was published in the Far Eastern Economic Review



Members of the Kampuchean National Front for National Salvation at a meeting in Kampuchea during late 1978

Eastern Economic Review on December 15th. On December 25th Vietnamese forces of about 100,000 troops invaded Kampuchea in support of the opposition to Pol Pot. His government was overthrown on January 7th. Resistance in the provinces has continued. Up to that point the Vietnamese government had called for negotiations on at least four occasions: June 7th 1977, February 5th 1978, April 10th 1978, June 7th 1978.¹⁷

The Pol Pot government has accused the Vietnamese of wanting to set up a Federation of IndoChinese countries with Hanoi in the dominating position. The Vietnamese government has denied this. Statements from the Pol Pot group appear to reflect traditional attitudes to the Vietnamese, echoes of nineteenth century history. I tend to think that what lies behind the December invasion is mainly the gravity of the economic crisis and its political consequences in Vietnam, and increasing conviction that problems with Kampuchea were related to Chinese hostility to Vietnam. China is the ally of Pol Pot and supplying arms.

At the end of the war Vietnam faced the tremendous task of rehabilitating the countryside. During the war both North and South Vietnam had received food aid and this had now come to an end. From 1976 there was a series of devastating natural disasters, first drought, then floods, and by the end of 1978 the country faced the gravest food crisis in its history, a short fall of rice of over four million tons. To ensure fair distribution in a time of shortage and to increase productivity, steps were taken to speed up social reforms in the south. Here the economy, including the rice trade, was dominated by the local Chinese, known as the Hoa people. Farmers on the Mekong were selling their rice to Chinese merchants at far above the price paid by the state and the blackmarket was flourishing both in the north and south. From March 1978 private trade was curtailed, state shops set up and a new currency issued with a ceiling on withdrawals. This led to the flight of the Chinese both by sea from the south and over the border into China. China protested against what it described as discrimination against the Chinese minority, dispute occurred at the border involving the departing Chinese and border incidents of various kinds increased. In May China announced it was withdrawing Chinese technicians and cancelling the factory projects. This was before Vietnam joined COMECON on June 30th. Through COMECON Vietnam was to receive about 900,000 tons of food aid. On July 3rd China completely cut off aid.

The attitude of the Chinese government seems to have been governed mainly by fear that Vietnam's wartime association with the Soviet Union would carry over into the peace. As it turned out, the Vietnamese government adopted flexible economic policies: retained membership of the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and International Monetary Fund, promulgated a foreign investment code in 1977, sought aid in Europe, Japan and elsewhere, and adopted a conciliatory attitude in negotiations with the United States, which denied aid and upheld its trade embargo.²² On November 3rd Vietnam signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union which carries with it six economic agreements. This step was taken after the failure of policies to diversify sources of aid, when economic crises was acute, and pressure intense on two borders, in the case of the border with Kampuchea, a costly, prolonged border conflict.

Until we know more about the political situation in Vietnam and Kampuchea, our interpretation of these events must be tentative. What is known with certainty so far suggests great caution before accepting the view widely expressed in the media that Vietnamese policy is expansionist, or that Vietnam is the puppet of Moscow.²³

- 1 Guardian 4/2/79
- 2 Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol.7 no.4, 1977
- 3 Pol Pot speech 27/9/77, Keesings 28805, broadcast 12/4/78 Keesings 29273; Chanda, Far Eastern Economic Review, 21/4/78
- 4 Shawcross articles, FEER 7/1/77, 14/1/77, 14/4/78. Keesings 29269
- 5 Shawcross FEER 14/4/78
- 6 Shawcross FEER 14/1/77
- 7 Keesings 28808
- 8 Keesings 29269; Carney, Communist Party Power in Kampuchea, 1977 has detail.
- 9 Stephen Heder's article in S.E.Asia Chronicle no.64, an issue devoted to Kampuchea and Vietnam.
- 10 Keesings 28805
- 11 Pol Pot broadcast 12/4/78
- 12 FEER 19/8/77 and 21/4/78
- 13 Chanda, FEER 17/3/78
- 14 Chanda, FEER 21/4/78
- 15 Report of U.N.High Commissioner for Refugees, Keesings 29272; FEER 23/6/78.
- 16 Keesings 29274
- 17 Keesings
- 18 See description of Foreign Ministry's Black Book, FEER 19/1/79.
- 19 Asia Wall St.Journal, 5/10/78; FEER Yearbook 1979; "Bridging Hanoi's Food Gap", FEER 20/8/76
- 20 Keesings 29469
- 21 ibid
- 22 Regional summary, FEER Yearbook 1979: "The die was cast; economically cornered, diplomatically isolated and militarily under pressure Hanoi bowed to Moscow." p.18
- 23 Relevant material in Horn, "Soviet Vietnamese Relations and the Future of S.E.Asia." Pacific Affairs Vol 51 no.4, 1978/79. (Published since this paper was prepared).



. Kampuchean revolutionary armed forces entering the once bustling city of Phnom Penh on January 7th 1979


Workshop

INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY - Laurel Black (Politics Dept., Adelaide University. (precis)).



The independent Indonesian state has always sought to be an influential force in regional affairs. During the early 1960s, it appeared that Indonesia would use its position in the region to mitigate the influence of the Western capitalist powers. Needless to say, this policy was at variance with the interests of Western capital.

Following the military coup of 1965, and Indonesia's concomitant reintegration into the world market, its regional influence was increasingly used to consolidate Western interests. It was within this context that Jakarta's policy towards Timor evolved.

Indonesia's ostensible objections to an independent East Timor revealed, to a certain extent, its policy of regional hegemony. Whilst some concern was expressed at the area's political and economic unviability and its potential effect on internal dissident and secessionist movements, fears of great-power peddling also constituted a major objection.



theme: PACIFIC BACKGROUND.



ADDRESS: "MOVEMENTS FOR INDEPENDENCE IN THE PACIFIC" MIKE PARSONS

SOUTH PACIFIC ACTION NETWORK AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACTION

Vanuaaku; called New Hebrides by Colonial powers. World's only condominium jointly governed by France and Britain. Originally three administrations French, British and joint, or Condominium. Vanuaaku pati (formally New Hebrides National Party) is the mass based anti colonial independence movement which won 60% of the vote in a non universal suffrage election in 1975. Due to automatic seats being given to country's commercial interests, led by manager of Australian multinational Burns Philp, the Vanuaaku party did not win a majority in the assembly and walked out, in 1977. New election was boycotted by the V.P who instead declared a People's Provisional Government on November 29th, 1977. Thirty-eight members of the pro French political parties and sympathisers were declared "elected" without a vote taking place, because of the absence of opposing candidates. The V.P, P.P.G began running a large area of the country with 60%+ support from the population. It had more than 60 subcommittees representing all islands. A 60 member council of commissars, who met in between National Congresses and a six member cabinet. P.P.G headquarters was on the island of Tongoa, and broadcasted over its own radio, Radio Vanuaaku. Territorial zones were established and no one without a permit or pass from the P.P.G could enter P.P.G zones. P.P.G business licences were also issued, and P.P.G collected registration fees. With the threat of Civil War by the French, and of British sending in troops to smash the P.P.G and arrest of P.P.G leaders, negotiations were carried out in 1978. P.P.G was suspended on May 8, 1978 following the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Electoral Reform to pave the way towards new elections. With the promise of new elections, the V.P in what it termed a National Caretaker Government, or Transitional Government. To delay the election, the French insisted that a new census be carried out. This was nearly completed by June. On July 3rd, the French and British Ministers, Blake and Dijoud met, and agreed that a constitution be drawn up and approved before the election.

This was initially opposed, then agreed to by, the V.P on the basis that the constitution be only a draft to be ratified by the newly elected government. The V.P actually quit the Constitutional Planning Committee on April 25th, and rejoined on June 11th. The constitution was approved by the two ministers in Vila, at 4 am on September 19th, following demonstrations the previous day in Vila, Tanna and Santo which were organised personally by the French resident commissioner. The election to be held on the 14th of November was to be the first universal suffrage election held, and 18 year olds could vote. V.P strength grew continually up to the election date. Some 75 subcommittees had been formed. The V.P won a landslide victory in the general election, with 26 out of 39 seats, a clear two thirds majority allowing them to alter the constitution. To the French forces dismay, the V.P also won the two regional elections on Santo and Tanna. This brought successionist attempts on these islands. Nagriamel organised ten lorry loads of armed supporters and French planters who gave all V.P supporters 24 hours to get off the island or be shot. Eight hundred and fifty people fled the island in boats. On Tanna, a former French war veteran and organiser of the successionist Four Corner Movement, Antoine Fornelli returned

secretly and organised 2000 men to take over the island. Both these moves were defeated when international pressure forced the French and British to act, which they did, extremely slowly and reluctantly. On Santo, the election of five chiefs by the 15 member regional assembly went off smoothly, but, on Tanna pro colonial party supporters blockaded and sabotaged the election. Three out of five chiefs elected were V.P supporters. Independence is expected in May/June/July of 1980. The V.P.T Government is led by Chief Minister Walter Lini, with ten ministers, and chaired by Fred Timakata one of the joint chairmen of the V.P Executive Council.

New Caledonia:

Though trying to appear "progressive" in the Vanuaaku situation, the French continue to increase repression of the Kanak independence movement in New Caledonia. In N.C there are three main tendencies; reactionaries and extreme fascists, autonomists and independtists. Following th announcement of the Dijoud Plan in which the existing Territorial Assembly was dissloved and a new "electoral reform" imposed; the parties regrouped. The "electoral reform " was imposed upon the basis that eleven parties were too numerous for 35 seats, in which a party had to gain 7.5% of the vote to be represented. The South, where most Europeans lived, was granted one additional seat to a total of 17 seats. The East coast, home of the Kanak reserves, had seven seats as had the West coast and the Loyalties had five. Thus Kanak areas had 12 seats and the Europeans had 24 seats. The parties favouring independence - Union Caledionienne, Palika, Kanak Liberation Party, United Front for Kanak Liberation, Progressive Melanesian Union and Caledonian Socialist Party regrouped to form the Front Independtist. In July 12th, 1979, the F.I won 34.42% of total votes in the new election and 82% of the Kanak vote. This gave them 14 seats out of 36 in the Assembly. Seven seats were won by the Autonomists who regrouped as the Federation for a New Caledonian society. The right wing parties favouring departmentalisation and intergration with the French republic won 15 seats (Group for New Caledonia in the Republic). The council of Government with seven seats is governed by a majority of right wingers.

The policy of the French Government is to win more time, and flood the country with politically anti Kanak sympathisers. It has a massive immigration policy which, if implemented, would increase the population of N.C from the present 136,000 to 300,000 reducing the proportion of Kanaks who make up less than half the population now. From 1969 until 1976, 13,000 Europeans immigrated to N.C and in 1972, Laroque, the right-wing mayor of Noumea announced that a white policy had to be enforced to solve the Kanak problem.

Laroque has often been observed heading demonstrations by the Movement for Order and Peace (M.O.P), a paramilitary fascist group.

Dijoud enforces a policy of paternalism towards the Melanesians by only handing back lands under certain conditions, preparing the Melanesia 2000 Culture Festival and encouraging tourism. His catchcry is Melanesian promotion. This has not prevented the sacking of PALIKA schoolteachers who organised demonstrations against Giscard d'Estaing when he visited N.C in July (1979). These demonstrations sparked off huge demonstrations across the country in August and September. Massive repression followed. Squads of riot police savagely beat and gassed demonstrators. This, in turn led to widespread strikes and the closure of schools throughout the nation for over a month.

Among the local parties, the U.C (United Caledonienne), which is the oldest party still has enormous influence on the middle aged and older Melanesians. Leader Lenormans is now committed to independence.

FULK concentrates on winning external support and the UPM has radicalised itself on the land problem. The Socialist Party has split but is on the side of independence.

PALIKA is the most influential, radical, militant and firmly socialist of all the independence parties. Many of its leaders argue against participation in parliament and prefer mass struggle.

There are now 7000 troops occupying N.c to counter "internal disorder". They are supported by MOP and a similar group, CACI (Action Against Independence). On August 25th 1979 the High Commissioner was asked by MOP to dissolve PALIKA.

There is one tendency amongst the trade unions led by young Europeans who want support for the F.I. There is also another tendency which is more moderate and which wants autonomy. Two militant trade unions were recently formed - the Teachers' Union and the Union of Female House-Cleaners. They wish to unite the union struggle with the struggle for national liberation.

The churches have become more political. The Evangelical Church has officially come out in favour of independence although a section of the Noumea middle class has protested. The Catholic Church has problems with the Kanaks over lands that have to be handed back. Archbishop Klein favours the status quo and claims to be neutral. Younger priests favour national liberation.

Economically, the country is dominated by the Imetal nickel mines which are controlled by Rothschilds and the Government. After a bad year in 1978, however, there are problems with nickel stockpiles.

Tourism is the alternative to the nickel industry, but multinationals like Club Med are resented by small hotel owners just as Imetal is by the "petit mineurs". Imetal managers anxious not to be swept away by Kanak rage favour Rhodesian style independence.

The present tasks of PALIKA are to politicise workers through their trade unions, to organise the masses, to allow immediate mobilisation in Noumea, to politically educate reserves from Noumea, to increase contacts between militants and the masses, and to occupy lands.

Victory for Vanuaaku Pati

by Denis Freney

VANUAAKU: The Vanuaaku Pati won a landslide victory in the November 14 elections in New Hebrides.

The party, which will form a government to lead the country to independence early next year, is claiming 75 per cent of the vote and a two-thirds majority in the Assembly.

The result is a rebuff to French Resident Commissioner Robert's attempts to bribe electors to vote for puppet pro-French "moderate" parties.

Reports say that an independent Vanuaaku will allow independence forces in another French territory, New Caledonia, to establish a government in exile in the New Hebrides' capital, Vila. In response, Robert has threatened to cut off \$24 million French aid offered for the coming year. The aid will be conditional on the Vanuaaku Pati not going beyond verbal support for the New Caledonian and French Polynesian independence struggles.

Further French manoeuvres can be expected. But the high Vanuaaku Pati votes in the islands of Tanna and Santo will make it difficult for the French to proceed with plans for the secession of these islands.

As the Vanuaaku Pati spokesperson told Mark Baker of *The Age* Vanuaaku has had to fight for its independence and will not be fully independent until New Caledonia and Tahiti are also independent. That is a defiance that the French imperialists will not treat lightly. ■

.... an extract from

TRIBUNE 21/11/79

Workshop

NUCLEAR-FREE PACIFIC CAMPAIGN - Ashley Campbell (Pacific Solidarity/ CANE).

THE ISSUES.

1. Nuclear Tests.

- 1.1 French tests in Polynesia (radiation victims, land destruction, underground testing)
- 1.2 U.S. tests in Micronesia (radiation victims, land destruction).

1. Nuclear Weapon Storage.

- 2.1 Hawaii and Guam
- 2.2 Possibly Ponape (in Micronesia).

3. Bases which Aid Nuclear Weapon Delivery Systems.

- 3.1 U.S. bases in Australia and New Zealand (N.W. Cape, Pine Gap, Nurrungan, etc.)
- 3.2 U.S. bases in Guam and Hawaii.

4. Nuclear Warships and Submarines.

- 4.1 U.S. - Recent visits to New Zealand, Australia and Pacific Islands.
 - Movement of subs into South Pacific waters.
 - Trident submarines (proposed the first 13 will be in Pacific).
- 4.2 U.S.S.R. - mainly in Northern Pacific.

5. Naval facilities for U.S. nuclear ships and submarines.

- 5.1 Hawaii and Guam.
- 5.2 Plans for Tinian and Palau (both in Micronesia)
- 5.3 Cockburn Sound (near Perth).

6. U.S. Airforce Bases.

- 6.1 Hawaii, Guam.
- 6.2 Kwajalein and plans for Tinian (both in Micronesia).

7. Missile Testing Ranges.

- 7.1 U.S. - Kwajalein I.C.B.M. testing range (Micronesia)
- 7.2 U.S.S.R. - near Cook Island
 - north Pacific.

8. Uranium Mining.

- 8.1 Australia
- 8.2 Niue (exploration stage)

9. Nuclear Reactors.

- Proposed for New Caledonia and Palau.

10. Nuclear Reprocessing.

- Possibly in Micronesia.

11. Nuclear Waste Treatment and/or Storage.

- Proposed for Micronesia and Australia.

SOME VICTORIES.

1. End of French testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere.
2. Banning of nuclear reactors and disposal of nuclear wastes on Hawaii.
3. Delay of plans for Palau superport and hence plans for associated nuclear reactors.
4. Rapid growth of anti-uranium movement in Australia and hence a long delay to uranium mining and a boost to the international anti-nuclear movement.

IMPORTANT EVENTS.

1. 1975 Nuclear Free Pacific Conference held Fiji. The first time that activists from all over the Pacific gathered together to discuss nuclear issues. At the Conference the Pacific People's Action Front was established. The link between the anti-nuclear struggles and the independence movements was emphasized.
2. 1978 Nuclear Issues Conference in Ponape (Caroline Is., Micronesia). This was a follow up to the 1975 Conference. Many practical actions were planned and the need for extensive education on the issues, at grassroots level was emphasized.

PRESENT ACTIVITIES.

At the 1978 Conference, Pacific people put high priority on the following work:

1. More international actions and expressions of solidarity. e.g. the publicising of all the Pacific nuclear issues on March 1 (called Nuclear-Free Pacific Day) in all the Pacific Islands and Pacific Rim countries.
2. Grassroots education work about Pacific nuclear issues.
3. Tours to publicise decisions and resolutions of the Ponape Conference.
4. Building up the circulation of POVAI (the paper produced by the Pacific People's Action Front, Box 534, Suva, Fiji).
5. Research into the links between the operations of trans-national corporations in the Pacific and military activity in the Region.

PREAMBLE TO THE TREATY FOR A NUCLEAR-FREE PACIFIC

1. We, the peoples of the Pacific want to make our position clear. We are rapidly regaining control of our lands, and the fact that we have inherited the basic administration system imposed upon us by alien imperialistic and colonial powers does not imply that we have to perpetuate them and the preferential racist policies that went with them.
2. We, the peoples of the Pacific have been victimised too long by foreign powers. The western imperialistic and colonial powers invaded our defenceless region, they took over our lands and subjugated our people to their whims. This form of alien colonial political and military domination unfortunately persists as an evil cancer in some of our native territories such as Tahiti, New Caledonia, Australia and New Zealand. Our environment continues to be despoiled by foreign powers developing nuclear weapons for a strategy of warfare that has no winners, no liberators and imperils the survival of all humankind.
3. Our environment is further threatened by the continuing deployment of nuclear weaponry and nuclear arsenals in the so-called strategic areas throughout the Pacific. Only one nuclear submarine has to be lost in the sea, or one nuclear warhead dumped in our ocean from a stricken bomber and the threat to the fish, and our livelihood is endangered for centuries. The erection of superports, military bases, and nuclear testing stations may bring employment, but the price is destruction of our customs, our way of life, the pollution of our crystal-clear waters and brings the ever-present threat of disaster by radioactive poisoning into the every day lives of the peoples.
4. We, the peoples of the Pacific reaffirm our intention to extract only those elements of Western civilisation that will be of permanent benefits to us. We wish to control our destinies and protect our environment in our own ways. The customary usage of our people in the days gone past were more than adequate to ensure the balance between nature and humankind. No form of administration should ever seek to destroy that balance for the sake of brief commercial gain.
5. We note in particular the recent racist roots of the world's nuclear powers and we call for an immediate end to the oppression, exploitation and subordination of the indigenous people of the Pacific.
6. We, the peoples of the Pacific will assert ourselves and wrest control over the destiny of our nations and our environment from foreign powers, including the transnational corporations.

THE PEOPLES' TREATY FOR A NUCLEAR-FREE PACIFIC

Nuclear Issues Conference, 23rd to 28th October 1978, Ponape, Caroline Is., Micronesia.


THE TREATY.

We, being inhabitants of the Pacific:

1. CONVINCED that our peoples and our environment have been exploited enough by super-powers;
2. ASSERTING that nuclear powers in the Pacific are operating here against our will, from territories administered or claimed by them as colonies;
3. BELIEVING that the political independence of all peoples is fundamental to attaining a Nuclear-Free Pacific;
4. BELIEVING that nuclear tests in the Pacific and the resultant radiation constitute a threat to the health, livelihood and the security of the inhabitants;
5. BELIEVING that nuclear tests and missile tests are the major means by which the armaments race maintains its momentum;
6. BELIEVING that the presence of nuclear weapons, nuclear reactors, nuclear powered vessels and nuclear wastes in the Pacific endangers the lives of the inhabitants;
7. RECOGNISING the urgent need for ending the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons;
8. DESIRING to contribute towards the ending of the armaments race;
9. and NOTING that a nuclear-free zone is not an end in itself but only a step towards total, worldwide nuclear disarmament, have agreed as follows;
10. ARTICLE 1: THAT A PACIFIC NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE BE DECLARED including all that area of the South Pacific bounded by the Tlatelolco (Latin America), Antarctic, Indian Ocean and ASEAN zones, and extending to 10°N and also including all of Micronesia and Australia; (2)
11. ARTICLE 2: THAT THE PEOPLES AND GOVERNMENTS OF THE PACIFIC WILL NOT permit any of the following activities or installations within this zone:
 - (a) all tests of nuclear explosive devices including those described as "peaceful";
 - (b) all nuclear weapon test facilities;
 - (c) all tests of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and systems (3)
 - (d) all storage, transit, deployment or any other form of presence of nuclear weapons on land or aboard ships, submarines and aircraft within the zone;
 - (e) all bases carrying out command, control, communication, surveillance, navigation and any other functions which aid the performance of a nuclear weapon delivery system; (4)

- (f) all nuclear power reactors, excepting very low capacity experimental units, all nuclear powered satellites, surface and sub-surface vessels and all transit, storage, release or dumping of radioactive material;⁽⁵⁾
- (g) uranium mining, processing and transport.

12. ARTICLE 3: THAT THE PEOPLES AND THE GOVERNMENTS WITHIN THE ZONE will withdraw from all mutual-defence alliances with nuclear powers;⁽⁶⁾
13. ARTICLE 4: THAT THE PEOPLES AND GOVERNMENTS SIGNATORY TO THIS TREATY will work to ensure the withdrawal of colonial powers from the Pacific;
14. ARTICLE 5: THAT THE PEOPLES AND GOVERNMENTS SIGNATORY TO THIS TREATY will meet at intervals of not more than three years to explore ways of extending the geographical extent of the zone and the comprehensiveness of the bans enforced within it;⁽⁷⁾



PROTOCOLS TO THE TREATY FOR A NUCLEAR-FREE PACIFIC

15. PROTOCOL I (1b)

- (i) "The undersigned plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by their respective governments,
- (ii) AWARE of the desire of Pacific people to gain political independence, and to remain free of the risks associated with nuclear weapons, nuclear war and nuclear power,
- (iii) HAVE AGREED to observe all the prohibitions and activities and installations associated with nuclear war and nuclear power as established in the TREATY FOR A NUCLEAR-FREE PACIFIC zone,
- (iv) AND HAVE FURTHER AGREED to take immediate steps to grant political independence to territories and peoples at present governed by them within that zone".

16. PROTOCOL II (1c)

- (i) "The undersigned plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by their respective governments,
- (ii) HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
 - a. TO RESPECT all the prohibitions on activities and installation associated with nuclear war and nuclear power as established in the TREATY FOR A NUCLEAR-FREE PACIFIC zone;
 - b. TO PERMIT at any time inspection by representatives of governments and peoples within the zone, of any buildings, installations, vehicles, ships, aircraft or submarines under their control to determine that the prohibitions of the treaty are being complied with: (8)
 - c. NOT TO USE or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against any territory or people within the zone."

EXPLANATORY NOTES TO THE TREATY FOR A NUCLEAR-FREE PACIFIC.

(1) THE SIGNATORIES.

- (1a) THE TREATY: to be signed by the peoples of the zone and their governments.
- (1b) PROTOCOL I: to be signed by all foreign governments with Colonies, or Territories, or other islands, reefs, or human-made islands over which they or their citizens within the zone indicated have control.
- (1c) PROTOCOL II: to be signed by all governments, including those under category (1b).

(2) THE GEOGRAPHICAL EXTENT OF THE ZONE.

The ZONE is delimited as follows:

TO THE EAST: by the Latin American Nuclear-Free zone (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) at 115° West;

TO THE SOUTH: by Latitude 60° giving common boundary with the area covered by the ANTARCTIC TREATY;

TO THE WEST: by the INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE (as defined in United Nations document A/AC 159/1) between Antarctica and Australia; and to the north of Australia by the as yet undefined ASEAN ZONE OF PEACE but to include the whole of Australia, all the lands, reefs and territories of Papua New Guinea, and all the Micronesian Islands and reefs east of Longitude 130° East.

TO THE NORTH: by the whole of the area designated as the Trust Territory of Micronesia, including the islands of Guam and Wake, and continuing East across the Pacific at 10° Latitude North to a common boundary shared with the TREATY OF TILATELOLCO.

(3) BAN ON TESTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS.

This refers particularly to the Kwajalein Missile range in the Marshall Is. in Micronesia.

(4) BASES ASSOCIATED WITH NUCLEAR WAR.

In the conduct of nuclear war, the installations which transmit launch-commands, provide electronic guidance or navigation signals and so on, are just as important as the missiles, aircraft and warheads themselves. In the event of a nuclear war, these installations are even more likely to become nuclear targets than are the warheads or vehicles themselves, because their locations are better known and they are more vulnerable. This Article requires electronic bases in Guam, Kwajalein, Wake, Australia and New Zealand to close down.

(5) NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS.

Medical uses of radioisotopes are to be exempted from these restrictions provided their use and disposal are carefully managed.

(6) RENUNCIATION OF "MUTUAL-DEFENCE" NUCLEAR ALLIANCES.

This Article refers particularly to the "nuclear umbrella protection" the ANZUS alliance supposedly affords Australia and New Zealand. States within the zone can hardly expect other powers to renounce the use of nuclear weapons unless they themselves renounce "nuclear protection".

**theme: WHAT AUSTRALIA'S ROLE SHOULD
BE IN THE REGION.**

Workshop

THE ROLE OF AID & TRADE - Steve Keen, Sarah Sargent. (Ideas Centre Australian Freedom from Hunger Campaign/ Action for Development).

Although political independence has been achieved by many countries, the long history of colonialism now reflected in trade and aid has greatly impaired the development of the region. Australia now numbers among those countries who capitalise on this relationship in the present world economic order. This order encompasses four basic features:

1. International trade has been formulated from an industrial economic viewpoint.
2. An acceptance of a permanent, natural comparative advantage whereby the old colonial areas produce primary products and the industrialised countries produce manufactures.
3. That increased economic growth through trade is an accepted fact and that this in turn leads to a spill-over demand for increased production and increased trade.
4. That international demand for primary products is on an upward trend and that this is being met by the primary producers (developing countries) to their advantage.

We maintain that the creation of independent political economies is essential to the development of third world countries.

An economy which is independent must have the following characteristics:

1. Basic orientation of production towards meeting national demand.
2. A capacity to satisfy that demand quantitatively and qualitatively.
3. Predominant staffing at all levels by national citizens.
4. Ability to engage in international economic relations on equitable terms.

In the Pacific region, there are two groups of countries, in terms of trade. The first group includes the ASEAN countries, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan, which have achieved economic growth through export-oriented industrialisation. Although this growth has far exceeded any seen in industrialised countries it has given increased prosperity to the already rich and in doing so has exploited the poor. The industrialisation is based upon exploitation of low wages. Similarly any economic benefits from cash crops produced in these countries has worsened the lot of the rural poor.

The second group, which is the largest, is the rural-based economy countries locked in the role of primary producers. Though production has gone up quite a lot, the prices they receive have not, so the economic growth has not been as great as the increase in production. Very little of the economic growth has reached the rural poor, in fact in many respects they are worse off than they were 20 years ago.

Some people - the World Bank and our Treasury, to name but two - would argue that this is because there is not enough trade, rather

than because of trade. They argue that barriers to trade have prevented the full working through of the laws of economics. Remove the barriers, more trade will occur and everyone will benefit.

This is not just a supposition: it is based upon the theory of comparative advantage, perhaps the most elegant theory of economics. This is paraphrased to "All the world would benefit if each country specialised in what it was best at, rather than trying to produce for its own needs", and as such it would be as widely believed an axiom of economics as "supply and demand determine prices".

Simply stated, the theory of comparative advantage says that each country uses its resources of labour and capital to produce the same goods. One country (A) has a lot of capital and not much labour; the other (B) has a lot of labour and not much capital. Likewise, one of the goods (X) being produced requires a lot of capital and not very much labour; the other (Y) requires a lot of labour and not much capital.



Acknowledgements to Norman Mansbridge and Punch

Before trade each country is producing for its own needs. By opening up trade, country A which has a lot of capital and not much labour is able to shift some of its resources away from labour-intensive Y into capital intensive X. The same applies in reverse to B, and the overall greater efficiency means that total production of both goods goes up. There's more of everything, so everyone's better off, and everything is for the best in this best of all possible worlds. This is the basis for claims made by the Treasury, the Liberal Party and some Labor politicians and economists that Australia should "move out of" labour-intensive things such as textiles and into capital-intensive things such as mining and minerals processing, allowing our northern neighbours, who are more highly endowed with labour to produce the textiles for us.

We regard this theory as an elegant and pernicious sophistry which "justifies" the current exploitation of the poor in the Third World and argues for its continuation. It contains a simple flaw, which once exposed and removed not only reveals the theory as a lie, but turns all its conclusions on their heads.

Take the example of trade between Australia and America in the commodities wool (labour-intensive) and steel (capital-intensive). Before trade we are both producing for our own needs; after trade, Australia shifts some of its capital out of steel into wool, America shifts some of its capital out of wool into steel, production of both goes up and everyone is better off.

The point not explained by the theory is how does one convert a blast furnace into a sheep dip! Actual machinery - physical capital - cannot be shifted from one industry to another, though this is what the theory (implicitly) assumes. Instead all that can happen is that marginal producers of steel will try to sell their capital and invest the proceeds in the wool industry. But the opening up of trade has made their capital unprofitable: if they can sell at all, they will get far less than the market value it had before trade. The cash value of the capital they own has been reduced. Capital has been destroyed.

The outcome of trade is not that overall efficiency and production are increased, but that weak capital is destroyed by strong capital. In the case of underdeveloped countries, they have been tied into a dependent development by trade, and only by extricating themselves from international trade will they have the chance to truly develop.

The industrialisation of ASEAN, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan might seem to go against this. Transnationals from the developed countries are shifting their production to the underdeveloped



countries and then selling the goods to the developed world. We have said that comparative advantage locks the developing countries in their role as primary producers and restricts them from industrialising. However, this new phenomenon - industrialisation by proxy - is not a move towards economic independence for developing countries but a further step into the trap of dependence on the industrialised countries.

The ASEAN states are winning middle-men in this new form of dependent development, but it is a victory which benefits only the elite, represses the poor even more and ties them into a global strategy which is suicidal. By relocating production in the Third World and trying to sell what is produced in the First, flows of capital, goods and investment are distorted. It is logical for a firm to relocate its production in areas where costs (labour, taxes, etc.) are lower, and export to the rich countries. But what is to the firm a cost is to someone in the economy an income (on the macro level) and the relocation abolishes some of those incomes. The

net effect on the rich markets could be to reduce their wealth (this rebounds on the micro level making it difficult for the firm to sell the expected volume of goods at the planned price). If the negative effect is large enough and enough firms indulge in it, then the global economy will be set on a contracting path.

Australia is experiencing this trend as foreign and national firms are relocating to the Asian countries mentioned above. The effect is detrimental on four counts: first it suffers a decrease in production of investment goods for the local market. Secondly as foreign firms withdraw, profits which were previously retained to expand local production will instead be repatriated. Thirdly, our balance of payments will worsen as direct foreign investment is curtailed (except for mining). Fourthly, our balance of trade will imbalance as we import more and more of products which were once produced locally.

Dependence is the key word in the discussion of aid to developing countries. As such it can rarely assist development. At least 75% of aid is bilateral, ie government to government, and is frequently 'tied aid' requiring the recipient to spend it on the donor's goods and services. This often means that goods purchased are expensive and inappropriate - though they may suit the rich elite who decide what to buy.


Other forms of aid include:-

- (a) private investment: which is motivated by looking for a profitable return which is not necessarily helpful to the economy of the recipient; some of the potential adverse effects have already been discussed in relation to ASEAN.
- (b) loans: when a rate of interest is charged. This has led to many countries amassing debts which they have little hope of repaying (international moneylenders?), and which put a significant burden on the economy. Worst affected are the 48 "land-locked states".
- (c) surplus commodity sales: getting rid of surplus reduces storage costs and maintains the market price. The recipient government sells it on the local markets. As usual it's the rich with money who can buy it, and the poor who suffer again - if the market price is reduced by this, who do you think loses out, the sharecropper or the landlord?
- (d) technical assistance: useful if appropriate, but frequently it is Western oriented and more importantly Western owned, serving to bolster the rift between rich and poor. Bata Shoe's Nigerian factory for making plastic injection mould shoes employed 14 men, used almost 100% foreign inputs and put 2,000 local leather handicrafters out of work.
- (e) grants: when properly allocated these can help the poor establish self-sufficiency.
- (f) multilateral aid: given through an international body. Again can be good, can be bad. Ask any ex-World Bank employee, like Cheryl Hayter.

If aid, in any form, from any source, is designed (however innocently) with the primary aim of maintaining the commercial system which perpetuates the gross inequalities which exist in the Third World, then we condemn as a particularly insidious form of generosity. If, however, it is called for by those living in

underdeveloped countries so that they can achieve self-determination and if it meets with success, we would applaud all those concerned.

Nonetheless, it is our belief that development in the real sense can only be achieved by reforming commercial exchange, right from the landless peasant to the Western supermarket. But since this involves the abolition of the current world order, we have our doubts about the likelihood of much success.



RESOLUTIONS.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON EAST TIMOR, AUSTRALIA AND THE REGION

JANUARY 27-29, 1979 - ADELAIDE.

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED.

1. This National Conference in affirming its support for the East Timorese continuing struggle against Indonesian imperialist aggression, recognised that the Australian union movement is able to take significant punitive actions against the Indonesian imperialist expansionists and their multinational capitalist supporters in Australia, who refuse to withdraw their troops in accordance with UN resolutions which do not recognise Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia.

Union actions were taken in support of the Vietnamese people's struggle by the Seamen's Union of Australia and the Waterside Workers Federation, refusing to sail and load the Jeparit. We call on the Australian union movement, the ACTU and Labour Councils, and particularly unions involved in trade and transport to forcefully impose bans on all trade with the Indonesian military fascists as an act of solidarity with the courageous East Timorese people, whose war against the Indonesian invasion continues as fiercely as ever, despite the attempts of the capitalist media to pretend that East Timor is not Indonesia's Vietnam.
2. Realising their sensitivity to criticism, a resolution from this conference should be sent to the Indonesian Embassy in Australia condemning Indonesia's invasion of East Timor. As a consequence of Indonesia's action, until they withdraw from East Timor, a visit by the Indonesian President should not occur. We encourage this resolution to be backed by individual letters.
3. This Conference, representative of a wide range of groups in the Pacific-Asia region, held from January 27 to 29, in Adelaide, Australia, urged the Dutch Parliament to prevent the proposed delivery of Dutch corvettes to Indonesia. This conference urges this in view of Indonesia's treatment of political prisoners, and because the corvettes would be used to further the aggression by the Indonesian Government against the peoples of West Irian, Kalimantan and especially East Timor. (This was conveyed by telegram to the Dutch parliament).
4. This Conference calls on the Australian Government to immediately cease all military aid and arms sales to the Indonesian Government.
5. Conference expresses its deepest sympathy and solidarity with the East Timorese people following the heroic death of President Nicolau Lobato on December 31, 1978. President Nicolau Lobato expressed the deepest aspirations of the Maubere people for total

independence and liberation. He joins the many thousands of East Timorese who have given their lives in the struggle. Conference reaffirms its support for the East Timorese people and expresses its confidence that their struggle will continue to victory under the leadership of the Fretilin Central Committee.

6. (i) This Conference recognises that the lack of human rights in the South East Asian and Pacific regions is not accidental but the result of political and economic decisions;
(ii) these decisions are made in order to preserve the regimes in the face of the demands of international capital;
(iii) the widespread use of torture and repression is carried out not so much to extract information as to instill fear in the community;
(iv) this Conference resolves to help those organisations and campaigns that are involved in the struggle for political and human rights in the region.
7. That a small committee be set up from this Conference to look at the feasibility of conducting an education campaign among the South Australian Labor politicians regarding Penang Week and other cultural links with the repressive Malaysian regime.
8. That this National Conference respect the aspirations and expectations of the Aboriginal people and demands that the Federal Government consider the direction that was given in regard to Aboriginal people in the 1967 Referendum. Land rights is just the tip of the iceberg and is an integral part of the aspirations and expectations of the Aboriginal people. And here compensation for non-traditional people also has to be considered and only appropriate consultation with Aboriginal people in solving their own problems can work because who better has accurate knowledge and the manpower to continue to raise the self-esteem that so few have, so that Aboriginal people will no longer believe the myths (e.g. that they are unable to be educated) propagated by non-Aboriginal people.
9. This Conference expresses its solidarity with the independence movements in Vanuaaku, New Caledonia and French Polynesia and calls on the French and British Governments not to delay or hinder this year's elections in Vanuaaku but to honour their promise of Vanuaaku independence by the end of this year.
10. This Conference opposes the existence of foreign military bases in South East Asia as they pose a threat to the peoples of South East Asia, and beyond.
11. This Conference acknowledges that we were able to be present here because of the declaration of a public holiday to celebrate a day which marked an act of gross imperialism. Furthermore, this Conference recognises the continual acts of aggression against the original inhabitants of this country from that day to this. This Conference calls for the recognition of the basic human rights of all Australian Aboriginal people and also for the immediate release of all Aboriginal people who are political prisoners in their own country as a result of this continual aggression and subjugation.
12. This Conference condemns the USA for abrogating the promise made at the Paris Peace Accords in 1975, of substantial aid (reparations and reconstruction) to the Democratic (now Socialist) Republic of Viet Nam. We urge this condemnation should be publicly made by Australia and other countries in the region.

13. That we commend the holding of a meeting to bring to the notice of the community the contribution made by the late Dr. Malcolm Caldwell.
14. This Conference strongly censures the action of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in terminating Australian reparations to Vietnam. Further it calls for this resolution to be made known to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and their shadow counterparts, and urges that Australia reinstate reparations.
15. This Conference recognises the serious threat posed to Australians by the presence of foreign military bases on our soil. This Conference expresses particular support for the anti-Omega campaign in Victoria and calls on people all over Australia to form local committees to oppose the US bases menace. It recognises that foreign bases in Australia are a vital part of US strategy to determine the future of SE Asia and Australia. The ferocity of this strategy has been made sufficiently clear by recent events in East Timor.
16. In view of the immoral actions of the Australian Government in giving de jure recognition to Indonesian claims to sovereignty of East Timor, this Conference calls for united action by all those opposing Indonesia's aggression and especially:
 - (i) the organisation of large demonstrations to oppose Suharto's visit including a month of action between April 20 and May 20;
 - (ii) a call for renewed solidarity with the East Timorese people at all levels;
 - (iii) an invitation to be issued to a representative of Fretilin to visit Australia.
17. This Conference believes that border and other disputes between nations should be settled by peaceful means. The Conference therefore calls for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea to allow the Kampuchean people to decide their own future. In the context of the threat of war between China and Vietnam and China and the Soviet Union, the Conference calls on these nations to resolve their disputes peacefully and not to resort to military force. These disputes have hindered the degree of support afforded to national liberation movements in Asia and particular in East Timor from these nations and allowed the dictatorships of Asia, and particularly Suharto's, room to manouvre.
18. This Conference expresses support for the people of West Irian who for 16 years have been struggling for independence from the Indonesian State. We call on the Australian Government to discontinue its long-standing immoral and politically dangerous policy of appeasement of Indonesia and uphold the right of the West Irianese people to determine their own future. Specifically we condemn the Federal Government for rejecting the request for political asylum from Jacob Prai and Otto Ondawame, two leaders of the West Irian independence movement who currently remain illegally imprisoned in PNG and demand that this decision be immediately and unconditionally reversed.
19. That organisations and individuals at this Conference sponsor a tour by Noam Chomsky to Australia to speak on East Timor, the nature of the press in public opinion and other issues.
20. That consideration be given by relevant delegates at this Conference to the holding of a similar regional conference in another location next year.